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1. Introduction
The European Ombudsman has been in function since 1995.1 His office now
offers 456 million Europeans in 25 Member States the opportunity to ad-
dress themselves to the Ombudsman in 21 Treaty languages. This paper
analyses the Ombudsman institution from a constitutionalist perspective. It
explores the significance of the European Ombudsman institution for a func-
tioning European constitution. To prepare the ground, section 2 gives a very
short survey of the history, the mandate, the types of activities and the
workload of the European Ombudsman. Section 3 discusses the Ombuds-
man’s role as a constitution-maker and his proposals in the Constitutional
Convention. In section 4 the focus is on the Ombudsman’s functions within
the European institutional balance. Section 5 analyses his contribution to the
concretization and implementation of basic constitutional principles (democ-
racy, rule of law, and fundamental rights).
2. The European Ombudsman in a nutshell
2.1. The Ombudsman idea
The term “Ombudsman” comes from Swedish “ombud”, meaning “represen-
tative”. In Sweden, in 1713, the institution of the “King’s Highest Ombuds-
* Dr. iur., LL.M., (Harvard), Professor of Public International and Constitutional Law,
University of Basel.
1. Homepage: www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int. Book-length treatments include Marias
(Ed.), The European Ombudsman (Maastricht, 1994); Hamers, Der Petitionsausschuss des
Europäischen Parlaments und der Europäische Bürgerbeauftragte: Zu den aussergericht-
lichen Beschwerdeeinrichtungen in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Pfaffenweiler, 1999);
Meese, Das Petitionsrecht beim Europäischen Parlament und das Beschwerderecht beim
Bürgerbeauftragten der Europäischen Union (Frankfurt am Main, 2000); Heede, European
Ombudsman: Redress and Control at Union level (The Hague etc., 2000); Juvénal, Les recours
non juridictionnels dans l’ordre juridique communautaire (Aix-en-Provence, 2001); Guckel-
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man”2 was established as an organ of the executive in a monarchic State. In
1908, a parliamentary Ombudsman of Sweden, acting on behalf of the par-
liament, was established as an instrument of horizontal checks and balances
between the legislative and the executive branch. In a third mutation after
World War II,3 the institution was conceived as a representative of the citi-
zens, thereby serving no longer solely the rule of law, but the democratic
principle as well.4
In this shape, the Ombudsman idea spread around the globe.5 The first
wave of expansion occurred in the 1960s6 and early 1970s, when ombuds-
men were installed in many Member States of the EC. This was a reaction to
the dramatic expansion of the welfare functions of the State. As of the mid-
1970s, the demise of dictatorial states in Western Europe (Spain, Portugal,
Greece) triggered the establishment of ombudsmen in these countries. Fi-
nally, after 1989, ombudsmen mushroomed in the post-communist States of
Eastern Europe, some of which became EU Members in 2004. Obviously, in
the last-mentioned groups of States, the installation of ombudsmen formed
part of the national political strategy of coping with regime change, to mark
the beginning of a new era under the rule of law and democracy, and to pre-
vent new dictatorship. Today, approximately 120 national ombuds-institu-
tions function worldwide. There are also ombudsmen for specific subject
areas such as consumer protection, children’s rights, data protection, small
business issues, or the military forces. Moreover, ombuds-institutions have
been installed in the course of the international administration of territories,
e.g. in Bosnia and Hercegovina pursuant to the Dayton General Framework
Peace Agreement of 1995.7
berger, Der Europäische Bürgerbeauftragte und die Petition zum Europäischen Parlament:
Eine Bestandsaufnahme zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 2004); Barth, Bürgerbeauf-
tragter und Petitionsrecht im Prozess der europäischen Verfassungsgebung (Tübingen 2004).
See for a bibliography of books, theses and articles on the Europen Ombudsman the list in
www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/bibliog/en/default.htm, visited on 1 Sept. 2004.
2. Some years later renamed “Chancellor of Justice”.
3. In 1953, a Danish Ombudsman office was installed, which became the model that spread
around the world.
4. Magnette, “Entre contrôle parlementaire et ‘état de droit’: Le rôle politique du médiateur
dans l’Union européenne”, 51 Revue française de Science Politique (2001), 933, at 934.
5. See Diamandouros, “The European Ombudsman and the European Constitution”, in
Curtin, Kellermann and Blockmans (Eds.), The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (The
Hague, 2005, forthcoming); Magnette, supra note 4, at 934.
6. In 1962, the first Ombudsman office established outside the Nordic countries was in New
Zealand.
7. Gemalmaz, “Constitution, ombudsperson and human rights chamber in ‘Bosnia and
Herzegovina’”, 17 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (1999), 277–329.
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The Ombudsman idea is a response to two complementary trends: on the
one hand, it reacts to the significant increase of national (or even supra- or
transnational) administrative activity with a high level of regulation, e.g. in
the social and environmental sector, together with an extensive delegation of
powers to administrative authorities. On the other hand, a growing need for
individual rights’ protection vis-à-vis this expansive apparatus is felt. In this
setting, the Ombudsman provides individual redress and works systemically
to improve the quality of administration in general. His work is reactive and
proactive, and covers both the legal and the political plane8 (see section 4).
In order to properly fulfil these functions, an ombuds-institution must satisfy
four basic conditions:9 it must offer a fair procedure, it must be accountable
to the public, it must work effectively, and – probably most importantly – it
must be independent from the executive branch.10
2.2. The constitutional foundations of the European Ombudsman
The idea of a European Ombudsman was launched already in the 1970s, the
period of “Ombudsmania” in Western Europe, but was only realized with the
Treaty on European Union in 1992.11 The creation of this new office was di-
rectly linked to the introduction of European citizenship. The European Om-
budsman was intended to mitigate the serious democratic deficiencies of
European governance, to prevent further alienation of the sceptical public
from an anonymous administration “up there in Brussels”, and to polish up
8. See on this “dual role” of the Ombudsman: Heede, “Enhancing the accountability of
Community institutions and bodies: The role of the European Ombudsman”, 3 EPL (1997),
587, at 588.
9. Diamandouros, supra note 5.
10. See on independence as the central feature, Harden, “When Europeans complain: The
work of the European Ombudsman”, 3 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
(2000), 199–237, at 202; Harley Johnson, “Ombudsman – essential elements”, in Hossain et al.
(Eds.), Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman offices: National Experiences throughout
the World (The Hague, 2000), p. 785, at p. 786.
11. The first Ombudsman, the Finnish national Jacob Söderman, took up his work in Sep-
tember 1995. After 2 periods of office, he was succeeded by the Greek P. Nikiforos
Diamandouros on 1 April 2003, with a staff of 30 persons. See on the genesis of the European
Ombudsman, Heede, European Ombudsman, op. cit. supra, note 1, at pp. 10–20; Guckelber-
ger, op. cit. supra note 1, at pp. 78–83. See for the political problems surrounding the appoint-
ment of the first Ombudsman Magliveras, “Best intentions but empty words: The European
Ombudsman”, 20 EL Rev. (1995), 401, at 407–408. See for the Ombudsman’s own account of
the first year of office, Söderman, “A thousand and one complaints: The European Ombuds-
man en Route”, 3 EPL (1997), 351–361.
700 Peters CML Rev. 2005
the image of the EC/EU as a whole.12 Ever since, the enhancement of the re-
lationship between the European administration and the citizen has been the
raison d’être of the European Ombudsman.13
The legal bases of the Ombudsman in the EC Treaty are Articles 21 and
195.14 Pursuant to the latter provision, the European Parliament adopted in
1994 the European Ombudsman Statute (hereinafter: the Statute) in the form
of a parliamentary decision. The Statute governs the performance of the
Ombudsman’s duties.15 Under Article 14 of the Statute, the Ombudsman
adopted Implementing Provisions.16
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (“Constitutional
Treaty”/CT) of 29 October 200417 contains four Articles relating to the Euro-
pean Ombudsman. These provisions basically correspond to the relevant ex-
isting Treaty provisions. Besides technical modifications, some points of
emphasis were shifted, either through the wording or through the splitting up
and the positioning of the provisions within the Constitutional Treaty.18 The
Ombudsman as an institution is sketched out in Article I-49 CT “The Euro-
pean Ombudsman”.19 This provision forms part of Title VI: “The democratic
life of the Union”. In contrast, the Ombudsman is not mentioned in Title IV
12. Bono, “Maastricht et les citoyens: le médiateur européen”, 64 Revue française
d’administration publique (1993), 639–649, at 648 ; Baviera, “Les pétitions au Parlement
européen et le Médiateur européen”, 445 RMC (2001), 129, at 135; Tierney, “European citi-
zenship in practice? The First Annual Report of the European Ombudsman”, 2 EPL (1996),
517, at 517.
13. See CONV 466/02 CONTRIB 176 (by Söderman, “The place of the European Ombuds-
man in the future Constitution of the European Union”, 17 Dec. 2002).
14. Unmodified ex-Art. 138(d) of the 1992 version of the EC Treaty.
15. Decision of the EP on the Regulations and General Conditions Governing the perfor-
mance of the Ombudsman’s duties of 9 March 1994 (O.J. 1994 L 113/15), Annex X A. to the
Rules of Procedure of the EP. Minor amendments concerning the budgetary treatment of the
Ombudsman were made on 14 March 2002 (O.J. 2002, L 92/13).
16. Current version: decision of the Ombudsman adopting Implementing Provisions of 8
July 2002, in force since 1 Jan. 2003 = Annex X. B. to the Rules of Procedure of the EP,
www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/lbasis/en/provis.htm, visited on 18 Aug. 2004. Hereinafter:
Implementing Provisions.
17. CIG 87/2/04 REV 2 of 29 Oct. 2004 europa.eu.int/constitution/constitution_en.htm,
visited on 10 Nov. 2004.
18. Additionally, the right to good administration has been enshrined as binding law in the
Constitutional Treaty (Art. II-101 CT, see in detail below, 5.5).
19. Art. I-49 CT: “A European Ombudsman elected by the European Parliament shall re-
ceive, investigate and report on complaints about maladministration within the Union Institu-
tions, bodies or agencies. The European Ombudsman shall be completely independent in the
performance of his or her duties.” Art. 195(1) EC and Art. 48 Draft Constitution (DC) use
“appointed”, which was only in the CT replaced for “elected”. See for the reasons below, 4.4.
Ombudsman 701
(“The Union’s Institutions”). Article I-49 CT reproduces part of Article
195(1) EC and is a foundational, general norm. The Ombudsman’s election,
mandate, independence and the proceedings are spelled out in Article III-335
CT.20 Two further provisions relate the European Ombudsman to the citizens:
Article I-10 CT “Citizenship of the Union” lists citizens’ rights, one of
which is the right to apply to the European Ombudsman (para (2)(d)).21 This
provision corresponds to Article 21 EC. Finally, Article II-103 CT enshrines
the right to refer to the European Ombudsman as a European fundamental
right, as already embodied in Article 43 of the non-binding EU Charter of
20. Art. III-335 CT: “(1) The European Parliament shall elect a European Ombudsman. In
accordance with Articles I-10(2)(d) and I-49, he or she shall be empowered to receive com-
plaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities
of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices or agencies with the exception of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union acting in its judicial role. In accordance with his or her duties, the
European Ombudsman shall conduct inquiries for which he or she finds grounds, either on his
or her own initiative or on the basis of complaints submitted to him or her direct or through a
member of the European Parliament, except where the alleged facts are or have been the sub-
ject of legal proceedings. Where the Ombudsman establishes an instance of maladministration,
he or she shall refer the matter to the institution, body, office or agency concerned, which shall
have a period of three months in which to inform him or her of its views. The European Om-
budsman shall then forward a report to the European Parliament and the institution, body,
office or agency concerned. The person lodging the complaint shall be informed of the out-
come of such inquiries. The European Ombudsman shall submit an annual report to the Euro-
pean Parliament on the outcome of his or her inquiries. (2) The European Ombudsman shall be
elected after each election of the European Parliament for the duration of its term of office. The
European Ombudsman shall be eligible for reappointment. The European Ombudsman may be
dismissed by the Court of Justice at the request of the European Parliament if he or she no
longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties or if he or she is
guilty of serious misconduct. (3) The European Ombudsman shall be completely independent
in the performance of his or her duties. In the performance of those duties he or she shall
neither seek nor take instructions from any institution, body, office or agency. The Ombuds-
man may not, during his or her term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether gainful
or not. (4) A European law of the European Parliament shall lay down the regulations and
general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties. The European Par-
liament shall act on its own initiative after seeking an opinion from the Commission and after
obtaining the consent of the Council.” The italic phrases differ from Art. II-237 Draft Constitu-
tion (DC) of 18 July 2003 (CONV 850/03). In Art. III-335(4) CT, several phrases have been
deleted from the former para 4 of Art. III-237 DC, presumably in order to emphasize the re-
spective independent power of the European Parliament.
21. Art. I-10 CT: “Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties
provided for in the Constitution. They shall have: … (d) the right to petition the European
Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the Institutions and advisory
bodies of the Union in any of the Constitution’s language and to obtain a reply in the same
language.”
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Fundamental Rights.22 Although this provision contains elements of Article
195(1) EC, its novelty is the language of rights, which is not present in the
Treaty law as it stands.
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) brought the third pillar within the
Ombudsman’s mandate: according to Article 41(1) TEU, Article 195 EC is
applicable to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.23 In con-
trast, a similar reference to the second pillar (Common Foreign and Security
Policy) is missing in Article 28 TEU. The Constitutional Treaty demolishes
the “pillar” structure of the Union. This means that the Ombudsman’s man-
date is broadened to include all the Union institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies.
2.3. The Ombudsman’s “jurisdiction” ratione materiae and ratione
personae
The Ombudsman’s constitutional mandate is to combat “maladministra-
tion”.24 According to an authoritative definition, “maladministration occurs
when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which
is binding upon it.”25 The “rules and principles” referred to in this definition
are both legal and non-legal norms. This means that the Ombudsman’s appli-
cation of the standard of maladministration includes a review of lawful-
ness,26 but goes beyond it. In other words, there is an overlap with justiciable
questions which are also dealt with by courts.27
22. Art. II-103 CT: “Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or
having its registered office in a Member State has the right to refer to the European Ombuds-
man cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies
of the Union, with the exception of the European Court of Justice acting in its judicial role.”
This provision modifies Art. 43 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights only in technical re-
spects. See for the technical amendments (“institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the
Union”, instead of Community institutions) CONV 726/03 (Cover Note from the Praesidium to
the Convention, re: Charter of Fundamental Rights, Draft text of Part II with comments, 26
May 2003). “Offices” was added at an even later stage.
23. See decision on complaint 785/2002/OV of 17 Dec. 2002 on refusal of access to certain
documents of a conference on terrorism: Refusal justified for the protection of public security.
24. French: “mauvauise administration”, German: “Missstände”. Art. 195 EC; Art. III-235
CT.
25. The European Ombudsman, Annual Report 1997, 23 (O.J. 1998, C 380/13); welcomed
by the European Parliament in its Resolution on the annual report of the European Ombudsman
in 1997 (C4-0270/98), O.J. 1998, C 292/168, at para 2.
26. Maladministration includes unlawful activity and errors of legal reasoning and interpre-
tation, failure to respect a legal rule or principle, the principles of good administration or funda-
mental rights. See for a classic example Newbury Bypass, Complaint 206/27.10.95/HS/UK and
25 others complaints against the Commission, Annual Report 1996, 58, at p. 64.
27. Usher, General Principles of EC Law (London, 1998), at p. 100.
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The Ombudsman can deal only with maladministration by Union bodies,
not by Member States’ authorities.28 This limitation of the Ombudsman’s re-
view was introduced in order to avoid overlap with national ombudsmen or
similar bodies.29 It is important, because Union law is generally imple-
mented by the Member States. Centralized European administration is the
exception and limited to specific fields, such as competition law, State aid or
social policy. Furthermore, “administration” means executive-branch activ-
ity. Judicial,30 legislative and political action31 is not subject to the
Ombudsman’s review. “Standing” for an application to the Ombudsman is
granted to “any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing
or having its registered office in a Member State” (Art. 195(1) EC; Art. III-
335(1) CT).32
2.4. Ombudsman inquiries: Some data
Article 195 EC (Art. III-335 CT) characterizes the activity of the Ombuds-
man as conducting inquiries, not only on the basis of complaints, but also on
his own initiative. Since the European Ombudsman began to work in 1995,
he has conducted in total (only) 24 own-initiative inquiries (up to the end of
2003). 33 These were launched in instances where the Ombudsman suspected
systemic problems.34 The main bulk of inquiries arise from individual com-
28. See Art. III-335 CT: “… concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of
the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices or agencies … .” In contrast, petitions to the European
Parliament may also relate to Member State action.
29. Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 102
30. See the wording of Art. II-103 CT, similarly Art. III-335(1) CT (and previously Art.
195(1) EC): “… with the exception of the European Court of Justice acting in its judicial role.”
31. Of course the line between ostensibly a political administrative activity and political
action is blurred (see below, 4.2.).
32. The same category of parties is entitled to address a petition to the European Parliament
(Art. 194 EC; Art. III-334 CT). Note that the right to good administration (Art. II-101 CT) is
incumbent on “every person”, and not limited to Union citizens and residents. If the right to
good administration comprises access to the Ombudsman, the institutional provision on the
Ombudsman must be construed broadly (beyond its wording) in the light of the fundamental
rights’ guarantee.
33. Details of the own initiative proceedings are set out in Art. 3 Statute, supra note 15; Art.
9 Implementing Provisions, supra note 16.
34. Recent examples: Own initiative inquiry into good administration of the European
schools for children of staff (decision of 19 July 2004 (IO/5/2003/IJH); Draft recommendation
of 24 May 2004 to the European Commission in own initiative inquiry OI/1/2003/ELB into the
internal dispute resolution procedures available to national experts who are seconded to the
Commission; freedom of expression of Commission officials (OI/1/2001/GG); age limits for
EU recruitment competitions (OI/2/2001/(BB)OV); parental leave for EU officials (OI/4/2001/
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plaints. In the first full year of function (1996), the office received 842 com-
plaints.35 Eight years later, the number had tripled (2,436 new complaints re-
ceived in 2003).36 In total, the Ombudsman has so far dealt with more than
13,000 complaints.37 In 2003, the Ombudsman dealt with 2,611 cases (in-
cluding those brought forward from previous years), in 20 percent of which
the Ombudsman opened inquiries.38 Additionally, the Ombudsman started
five own-initiative inquiries in 2003. By comparison, the ECJ dealt with
1,468 cases in 2003 (of which 494 were closed), and the Court of First In-
stance with 1,338. Most complaints are directed against the Commission,39
whose decisions often have a direct impact on the citizens.40 Complaints are
also directed against the other institutions (Art. 4 EC; Art. I-19 CT) and
against bodies such as the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)41 or
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).42 Complaints frequently concern
late payment, contract disputes, arbitrary discrimination and, most often, ac-
cess to documents.
ME) (see summaries in Annual report 2002, p. 196 et seq.); judicial protection in tender proce-
dures (IO/2/2002/IJH).
35. Annual Report 1996, Statistics. See for the first year of office, Tierney, supra note 12,
at p. 517–529.
36. Figure from The European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2003 (unpublished, available
at the Ombudsman office), Annex 1.1, at p. 315.
37. Most of those complaints originate from the big Member States such as Germany,
France or Spain. However, in relation to the total EU population, the citizens in the big Member
States do not complain so much. The number of complaints from smaller Member States such
as Luxembourg or Belgium is rather over-proportionate. See for a geographical analysis of
complaints Annual Report 2003 (supra note 36), Annex 4.2., at p. 323.
38. In more than half of these cases, the Ombudsman gave advice. In a third of the cases, no
action was possible.
39. 67% of those complaints led to an inquiry in 2003 (Annual Report 2003, supra note 36,
Annex 3.2., at p. 320).
40. Complaints against the Commission from May to July 2004 concerned issues such as
the payment of outstanding amounts or damages under contracts with the Commission (e.g.
translation contracts, agreements on energy or development projects, services), problems with
the co-financing of an NGO by the Commission, the selection procedure in competitions, out-
standing payments of subsidies, public procurement (publicity of Commission calls for ten-
ders, handling of bids, allegedly unfair rejections of proposals by the Commission etc.),
reimbursement of funds in the context of programmes financed by the Commission, but also
access to environmental information.
41. See also the recent own-initiative inquiry concerning competitions organized by EPSO,
OI/2/2004/GG on the difficulty of the recruitment tests.
42. See the so-called “Blue Dragon case”, decision of 22 July 2004 on complaint 1769/
2002/(IJH) ELB concerning alleged fraudulent diversion of funds that were intended to benefit
the Blue Dragon company.
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2.5. Ombudsman complaint proceedings
When an individual complaint is addressed to the Ombudsman, he first ex-
amines whether it is within his mandate. This requires, as we saw, that the
complaint is directed against a Union body, as opposed to a Member State’s
administration, and that it concerns a possible instance of maladministra-
tion.43 Secondly, the complaint must meet further criteria of admissibility as
laid down mainly in the Statute, in particular the exhaustion of administra-
tive steps.44 Third, even if the complaint is within the mandate and admis-
sible, the Ombudsman still has a discretionary power to make an inquiry into
a complaint or to close the file.45 Generally, the Ombudsman finds sufficient
grounds to initiate inquiries only in about a quarter of the cases.46 On aver-
age, about half of the inquiries reveal no maladministration. If however the
inquiry reveals an instance of maladministration, the Ombudsman “as far as
possible co-operates with the institution concerned in seeking a friendly so-
lution to eliminate the maladministration and to satisfy the complainant.”47
In practice, this cooperation may lead to a settlement by the institution to the
full satisfaction of the complainant.48 Another outcome may be a so-called
“friendly solution” in the form of a compromise acceptable to both sides,
e.g. ex gratia payments without admission of liability.
43. E.g. in 2003, three quarters of the complaints were outside the mandate for various
reasons, mostly (92%) because the complaints were not directed against a Community institu-
tion or body (Annual Report 2003 (supra note 36), Annex 1.3.2, at p. 317). If the complaint is
outside the mandate, the Ombudsman may help the complainant by transferring the complaint,
e.g. to a national Ombudsman, to the European Commission or to the European Parliament or
by at least advising the citizen to contact a competent body.
44. Under Art. 2(4) of the Statute, supra note 15, the complaint is “preceded by the appro-
priate administrative approaches to the institutions and bodies concerned.” Officials and ser-
vants lodgings complaints related to their work relationship must exhaust the existing internal
remedies (Art. 2(8) of the Statute, supra note 15). These are in particular the procedures re-
ferred to in Art. 90(1) and (2) Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities of 1
May 2004, which basically require a complaint to the appointing authority.
45. Art. 195(1) EC; Art. 4(1) and (2) Implementing Provisions, supra note 16.
46. For instance, in 2003, the Ombudsman initiated an inquiry in 26% of the admissible
complaints, whereas he found no or insufficient grounds for inquiry in more than 73%. 363
inquiries were dealt with (Annual Report 2003 (supra note 36), App. 1.3.2., at p. 318 and Item
3, at p. 320).
47. Art. 6 Implementing Provisions, supra note 16.
48. Example: Following a complaint to the Ombudsman, Stockholm University received a
final payment due under a research project (1173/2003/(TN)IJH), Annual Report 2003 (supra
note 36), at p. 11.
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If a settlement or a compromise is impossible (e.g. when the matter is no
longer acute49) or unsuccessful, the Ombudsman has two forms of decision
at his disposal. The softer (and more frequently used) one is the critical re-
mark addressed to the institution, which the Ombudsman issues in cases with
no general implications and no need for follow-up action.50 The sharper tool
is a draft recommendation when the instance of maladministration is particu-
larly serious, can still be eliminated, or has general implications.51
If the Union body fails to respond adequately to the draft recommenda-
tion,52 the Ombudsman may, as a last substantive step, draw up a Special Re-
port to the European Parliament.53 This makes sense in situations where the
Ombudsman expects his position to be backed by the European Parliament.
From 1995 to summer 2004, only eight Special Reports have been issued
(the most recent one in December 2002),54 covering issues such as access to
documents (three Special Reports), the codification of principles of good ad-
ministration in form of a code or a binding regulation (two Special Reports),
and recruitment procedures and employment within the Union (three Special
Reports).
2.6. The network of Ombudsmen
The European Ombudsman forms part of a European network of ombuds-
men.55 Today, 24 of 25 Member States of the Union have national ombuds-
men or a functionally equivalent body.56 In the ten new Member States, the
49. This constellation is frequent, because a complaint to the Ombudsman does not have a
suspensive effect. This is an important limitation of the effectiveness of his individual redress
function (e.g. regarding recruitment procedures).
50. Art. 7 Implementing Provisions, supra note 16. The critical remark may be supple-
mented by “further remarks”, although this is not foreseen in the Implementing Provisions.
See, e.g., the decision on complaint 1288/99/OV, summary in Annual Report 2002, p. 98 et
seq.
51. Art. 3(6) of the Statute, supra note 15; Art. 8(1) Implementing Provisions, supra note
16.
52. The institution so informed by the Ombudsman should give a “detailed opinion” within
three months (Art. 3(6) of the Statute, supra note 15.
53. Art. 3(7) of the Statute, supra note 15; Art. 8(4) Implementing Provisions, supra note
16.
54. All Special Reports are posted on the Ombudsman’s web-site. www.euro-ombudsman.
eu.int/special/en/default.htm, visited on 2 Sept. 2004.
55. From the outset on, the European Ombudsman hoped to create strong links with his
national counterparts. See Boyron, “Current developments, European Community Law, I.
Constitutional Aspects”, 46 ICLQ (1997), 701, at 702.
56. See for the EU with 15 Members before enlargement European Parliament (authored by
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establishment of ombudsmen has been an important step in the transition
from communist rule to democracy. The most recent ombuds-institution was
created in Luxembourg.57 Germany has no federal Ombudsman, but its par-
liamentary petitions committee58 is similar. Moreover, Germany has a parlia-
mentary commissioner for the armed forces (Wehrbeauftragter).59 Italy is the
only Member State possessing neither an Ombudsman office at the national
level nor a parliamentary committee on petitions; there are, however, active
ombudsmen at the regional level.
Although ombuds-institutions and similar bodies in Europe vary in form
and function,60 they share important features. Their legal basis is mostly the
constitution, not just statute law.61 They are appointed by national parlia-
ments or on the basis of a parliamentary proposal. In most countries, the
Ombudsman office requires no particular qualifications. He is generally
elected for a period of four to six years. In general, the activities of local and
national governments and public institution fall within the ombudsman’s
field of competence. In all European countries, ombudsmen are completely
independent of the political authority and enjoy immunity. The ombudsmen
Crespo Allen), DG for Research, Working Paper: European Ombudsman and National Om-
budsmen or similar Bodies – Comparative Tables, POLI 117 EN, (Luxembourg, 2001).
www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/poli/pdf/117_en.pdf, visited on 21 Sept. 2004. See for the
respective debate in Switzerland, Siegwart, “Ombudstellen und Mediation”, 103 Schweize-
risches Zentralblatt (2002), 561 et seq. The proposal of a parliamentary committee to install a
Swiss Ombudsman was discussed by federal bodies, State governments and by political par-
ties. In February 2004, the committee decided not to table the proposal in the parliament’s
plenary session, basically for financial reasons.
57. Established by an Act of 2003, the médiateur took office in January 2004.
58. Art. 45c(1) German Basic Law; the individual fundamental right to petition is enshrined
in Art. 17 Basic Law.
59. Art. 45b German Basic Law.
60. The varying denominations of the office all over the world point to the multiple func-
tions: German “Bürgerbeauftragter”, Austrian: “Volksanwalt”, French: “Médiateur”, Spanish
and South-American: “Defensor del Pueblo”, British: “(Parliamentary) Commissioner”. See
for terminology, country surveys and functional comparisons, Caiden (Ed.), International
Handbook of the Ombudsman, 2 Vols (Westport, Conn. 1983); Pickl, “Europäische Ombuds-
mann-Einrichtungen aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht”, in Matscher et al. (Eds.), Europa im
Aufbruch, Festschrift Fritz Schwind zum 80. Geburtstag (Wien, 1993), p. 193 et seq; Marias,
supra note 1; Reif (Ed.), The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writing from the
International Ombudsman Institute (The Hague, 1999); Hossain et al. (Eds.), supra note 10;
Crespo Allen, op. cit. supra note 56.
61. 17 of the 25 EU Member States have a constitutional foundation for the Ombudsman
and/or of the right to petition. See “The constitutional status of ombudsmen and the right to
petition in Europe” of 13 Jan. 2003, in www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/letters/en/default.htm,
visited on 3 Sept. 2004.
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have considerable powers of investigation (documents and evidence) but do
not have any direct means of action. Most ombudsmen can propose to parlia-
ment (or to the government, in the case of France) that it repeal, reform or
adopt legislative texts. All the ombudsmen can submit particular problems to
the national parliaments and they also submit an annual report on their ac-
tivities.62
The European network of ombudsmen was established already in 1996
and today covers 90 offices in 30 countries, including the candidate States
and the Schengen area.63 Cooperation through the network covers both com-
plaint handling (transfers) and information to the citizens.64 Such transfers
are important, because the mandate of the European Ombudsman is limited
to maladministration by Union institutions, whereas the bulk of EU law is
applied by Member State authorities. It is therefore desirable that the Euro-
pean Ombudsman can swiftly refer complaining citizens to those national
and regional ombudsmen. Against this background, the European Ombuds-
man advocates the strengthening of non-judicial remedies, such as ombuds-
institutions, in the Member States. This would offer the citizens more
remedial options, would strengthen subsidiarity, spare the Union institutions
from overload, and contribute to administrative capacity building in the
Member States.65 Along the same lines, the European Ombudsman proposed
to the Constitutional Convention the adoption of an Article on ombudsmen-
cooperation and transferrals. The proposal was intended to ensure coopera-
tion in a spirit of trust between the European Ombudsman and the
ombudsmen and bodies dealing with petitions established in the Member
States, and to allow national ombudsmen to transfer a case involving funda-
mental rights under Union law to be dealt with by the European Ombuds-
man.66 This proposal did not, however, find any resonance.
62. Crespo Allen, supra note 56, at p. 7–8.
63. Annual Report 2003, supra note 36, at p. 14.
64. In 2003, 1.6% of all complaints were transferred, mostly to a national or regional Om-
budsman (25 cases in total), Annual Report 2003, supra note 36, Annexes 1.3.1. and 2, at p.
316 and 319.
65. Diamandouros, supra note 5.
66. CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76, “Proposals for Treaty changes” of 26 July 2002
register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00221en2.pdf, visited on 23 Aug. 2004. See also
speech by Söderman on 25 Feb. 2003 at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, “The Conven-
tion, the Charter and the Remedies”.
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3. The Ombudsman in the Constitutional Convention of 2002/2003
The European Convention67 presented to the Member States’ governments
the Draft Constitution (DC) of 18 July 2003,68 which was the basis for the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 29 October 2004 (Constitu-
tional Treaty/CT).69 In the Convention, the European Ombudsman had the
status of an observer.70 He submitted three formal contributions to the Con-
vention71 and gave numerous speeches in the plenary of the Convention, in
working groups of the Convention, in the European Parliament and in vari-
ous other fora.
It is striking that the Convention Praesidium’s “Skeleton” of the Draft
Constitution of 28 October 200272 contained no reference to the Ombuds-
man. This seems to be an indication of either a low priority of the Ombuds-
man issue or of its uncontestedness. Not surprisingly, the European
Ombudsman reacted to this omission with general reflections on the place of
the European Ombudsman in the Constitution.73 He argued that the Ombuds-
man must be mentioned in the European Constitution, because in most coun-
tries the existence and mandate of the national Ombudsman are considered
sufficiently important to be mentioned in the constitution. He suggested
placing the Ombudsman provision in the part of the Constitution dealing
with the institutional framework.74 This proposal was not fully realized. As
in the EC Treaty, the European Ombudsman is not mentioned in the Chapter
on the institutional framework of the Union.75 The European Ombudsman
also asked for the parliamentary nature of the Ombudsman to be men-
tioned,76 which was not done either. Last but not least, he suggested having
67. 1 March 2002 to 10 July 2003; materials available at european-convention.eu.int, vis-
ited on 5 Jan. 2005.
68. CONV 850/03.
69. Supra note 17.
70. See the very short survey without any account of the ombudsman’s proposals, in An-
nual Report 2003, supra note 36, at p. 266–67.
71. CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76 (supra note 66); CONV 466/02 CONTRIB 176 (supra
note 13); CONV 505/03 CONTRIB 206 “The functioning of the Institutions” of 23 Jan. 2003.
72. CONV 369/02.
73. CONV 466/02 CONTRIB 176 (supra note 13). See for further criticism e.g. the speech
by Söderman, Round Table on the Future of Europe on 18 Nov. 2002. See also CONV 438/02
CONTRIB 159 (Contribution by Tomlinson, Member of the Convention: “The European Om-
budsman should be included in the draft constitutional Treaty” of 28 Nov. 2002).
74. CONV 466/02 CONTRIB 176 (supra note 13).
75. See section 4.4. for the systematic position of the Ombudsman provisions.
76. CONV 466/02 CONTRIB 176 (supra note 13).
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the Ombudsman “elected” by the European Parliament, not “appointed”, as
in the EC Treaty. The new phrase should be a constitutional guarantee of in-
dependence.77 This proposal was adopted in the Constitutional Treaty.78
Apart from the Ombudsman’s proposals on the institutional provisions on
his office, the Ombudsman made four principal proposals: on fundamental
rights, on a chapter on remedies, on a European administrative law, and on a
network of ombudsmen and bodies dealing with petitions in the Member
States.79 A resolution of the national ombudsmen of the EU, which was sub-
mitted to the Convention as a contribution, dealt with the same four issues.80
These will be discussed in detail in section 5.
4. The Ombudsman and the European institutional balance
The institutional balance,81 as a European constitutional principle, is to some
extent a functional equivalent of the classic principle of separation of powers
in State constitutions: it modestly contributes to the realization of checks and
balances, and thereby ultimately fosters the containment of power to the ben-
efit of the citizens.82 To the same ends, good administration requires, inter
alia, a clear and reasonable distribution of functions to appropriate institu-
77. See Amendment Form, Suggestion for amendment of Art. 35, by Diamandouros; also
Verbatim Record of the Convention’s plenary session of 24 April 2003, pp. 29–30:
www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030424.htm, visited on 5 Jan. 2005.
78. See Art. I-49 and Art. III-335 CT. The new wording was introduced only in the Inter-
governmental Conference.
79. These proposals were made at numerous occasions. The principal document is CONV
221/02 CONTRIB 76 (supra note 66). See already the speech by Söderman, Round Table on
the Future of Europe on 18 Nov. 2002 (criticism of the so-called skeleton draft) also CONV
350/02 WG II 14 (Summary of the meeting held on Friday 4 October 2002, where Söderman
presented CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76), of 17 Oct. 2002).
80. Resolution adopted by the national ombudsmen and similar bodies of the Member
States of the EU, meeting at their fourth seminar, held in Athens on 7–8 April 2003, forwarded
to the Convention on 28 April 2004, europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/contrib/
doc080403_en.pdf, visited on 24 Aug. 2004, forwarded to the European Convention as a con-
tribution by the European Ombudsman (CONV 699/03).
81. Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority, [1958] ECR 9, at 44: “[T]here can be seen in the
balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community a
fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty …”. See recently Case C-233/02, French Repub-
lic v. Commission, judgment of 23 March 2004, nyr, para 40; Case C-257/01, Commission v.
Council, Opinion of A.G. Léger of 27 April 2004, para 55.
82. Jacqué, Cours général de droit communautaire, Collected Courses of the Academy of
European Law I-1 (1991), 237, at 293.
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tions.83 The Ombudsman forms part of the institutional balance, although he
is not mentioned as an institution or other body in Articles 7–10 EC. In the
Treaty’s institutional part (Part Five “Institutions of the Community”), the
Ombudsman figures in the section on the European Parliament. This system-
atic position has remained the same in the Constitutional Treaty.84
This section analyses the tasks of the Ombudsman in relation to the other
institutions.
4.1. The functions of the Ombudsman institution
The Ombudsman has, first, an individual redress function. In this regard, he
complements the Union and Member State courts, and the parliamentary pe-
titions committee. As the Court of First Instance put it: ”… in the institution
of the Ombudsman, the Treaty has given citizens of the Union, … an alterna-
tive remedy to that of an action before the Community Court in order to pro-
tect their rights. That alternative non-judicial remedy meets specific criteria
and does not necessarily have the same objective as judicial proceedings.”85
Ombudsman proceedings are flexible. They may in some instances be quasi-
judicial (review of legality: both in substance and procedure), but generally,
they display typical features of mediation (non-binding decision, consensual
settlement, win-win types of solutions, no costs for the parties, swiftness of
procedure).86
The second task of the Ombudsman (separable more from a theoretical
than practical point of view) is to control the administration in general, to en-
hance its accountability and to help improve its quality. With a view to this
systemic role, individual complaints to the Ombudsman are not conditioned
upon specific standing requirements. An actio popularis is admissible. Most
importantly, the Ombudsman’s proactive, systemic function is supported by
his own-initiative power. That role of the Ombudsman comprises, first, ca-
pacity-building. The Ombudsman seeks to strengthen the capacity of the
Union administration, but also (via the network of national ombudsmen) the
83. An institution’s lack of competence is a ground of illegality (Art. 230 EC) and consti-
tutes maladministration. See on “lawfulness” as an element of good administration Art. 4 of the
Code on Good Administrative Behaviour (a model code issued by the Ombudsman in 1999).
www.euro-Ombudsman.eu.int/code/pdf/en/ _en.pdf, visited on 16 Aug. 2004.
84. Art. III-335 CT is in Part Three, Title VI, Chapter I “Provisions Governing the Institu-
tions”, Section 1 on the institutions, Subsec. 1 “The European Parliament”.
85. Case T-209/00, Frank Lamberts v. European Ombudsman and European Parliament,
[2002] ECR II-2203, para 65.
86. The French translation of Ombudsman as “Médiateur ‘public’” is therefore appropriate.
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capacity of Member States’ public authorities to observe the law, to respect
principles of good administration and human rights.87
The Ombudsman’s systemic role includes incitement of legal and adminis-
trative reform, although the European Ombudsman is not a formal law-
maker.88 In the past, he has been quite successful in triggering reforms of the
transparency regime, and in improving the procedural position of complain-
ants in Article 226 procedures (see below, 4.4.). The Ombudsman was also a
driving force for the insertion of a fundamental right to good administration
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and he is working towards binding and
uniform rules on good administrative behaviour (see below, 5.5.1.). The
Ombudsman’s primary tool for rule-making is the Draft Recommendation.89
Of course, an Ombudsman recommendation is in itself mere “soft law”, both
in substance and in legal authority.90 But it is precisely this softness and flex-
ibility which enables the Ombudsman to propose even radical reforms,
which can not (yet) be realized in a hard legal act or a binding court judg-
ment.
Obviously, the Ombudsman’s functions overlap with the other institutions’
functions to some extent. This functional overlap makes it imperative that all
European institutions work together in good faith. Indeed, the Ombudsman
has a duty of cooperation with the other European institutions.91 In turn, the
other institutions are obliged to cooperate with the Ombudsman, in particular
when the Ombudsman exercises his specific powers of inquiry vis-à-vis the
other institutions (inspection of documents and testimonials).92 Compared to
the national ombudsmen, these powers are limited by unusual exceptions.93
87. Diamandouros, supra note 5.
88. The “legal source-function” of the Ombudsman is emphasized by Bonnor, “The Euro-
pean Ombudsman: a novel source of soft law in the European Union”, 25 EL Rev. (2000), 39–
56; Bonnor, “Ombudsmen and the Development of Public Law”, 9 EPL (2003), 237–267 (in a
comparative study of the Swedish and the Danish Ombudsman).
89. Art. 2(1) of the Ombudsman Statute, see supra, 2.2.
90. Bonnor, “European Ombudsman”, supra note 88, at p. 41.
91. Case C-234/02 P, European Ombudsman v. Lamberts, judgment of 23 March 2004,
nyr, para 82.
92. Under Art. 3(2) of the Statute, supra note 15, “the Community institutions and bodies
shall be obliged to supply the Ombudsman with any information he has requested of them and
give access to the files concerned. They may refuse only on duly substantiated grounds of
secrecy. … Officials and other servants of the Community institutions and bodies must testify
at the request of the Ombudsman; they shall speak on behalf of and in accordance with instruc-
tions from their administrations and shall continue to be bound by their duty to professional
secrecy.”
93. See the exceptions in Art. 3(2) of the Statute, supra note 15. See for a critical analysis
Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 126–131.
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But the Ombudsman’s critique94 and his quest for an extension of his powers
of investigation vis-à-vis the institutions95 have so far not led to amendment
of the Ombudsman Statute.
4.2. The Ombudsman and the European Parliament
As already mentioned, the EC Treaty and also the Constitutional Treaty link
the Ombudsman to the European Parliament96 merely by the textual place-
ment of the core provision on the Ombudsman (Art. 195 EC; Art. III-335
CT). The Ombudsman Statute is formally a decision of the European Parlia-
ment. Moreover, the Ombudsman is appointed (under the Constitutional
Treaty: “elected”97) by the Parliament. Election by the legislature is a central
element of the original Nordic Ombudsman model, as well as of the Danish
export version. Its purpose is not subordination to the legislature, but to
guarantee the Ombudsman’s independence from the executive.98 Finally, the
Ombudsman is answerable to Parliament. But his obligation to report indi-
vidual decisions and to submit an annual report to the Parliament must be
assessed in the light of the constitutional guarantee that the Ombudsman is
“completely independent in the performance of his duties” (Art. 195(3) EC;
Art. I-49 CT). Consequently, parliamentary supervision, including the possi-
bility to dismiss the Ombudsman upon request of the Parliament, relates only
to the Ombudsman’s overall functioning and allows sanction for “serious
misconduct” (Art. 195(2) CT; Art. III-335(2) CT). This scheme does not
subordinate the Ombudsman to parliament.99 The Ombudsman is in the
94. In his Annual Report 1998, the Ombudsman expressed the view that the limitations are
unnecessary and inappropriate as a matter of principle. In the following years, problems have
arisen in some few cases with regard to hearing of witness and inspection of files (concerning
only Commission documents). See the speech by Söderman on 24 May 2000 before the Com-
mittee on Constitutional Affairs of the EP, note prepared for Mme Almeida Garrett concerning
the possible revision of Art. 3(2) of the Statute of the Ombudsman.
95. The Ombudsman asked for removal of the institutions’ possibility to refuse the Om-
budsman access to files, and of the duty of officials and servants to speak only under instruc-
tion. He proposed a liberation of Community officials from their duty of professional secrecy,
so that they would have an unqualified obligation to testify. See speech by Söderman to the
Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the EP on 5 March 2001 (“Modification of Article 3 of
the Ombudsman’s Statute”); EP, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Draft Report on the
amendment of Article 3 of the Statute of the European Ombudsman.
96. See for comparative analyses of the two institutions Hamers, op. cit. supra note 1,
Meese, op. cit. supra note 1, Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1 and Barth, op. cit. supra note 1.
97. See on this amendment supra, section 3.
98. Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at p. 202.
99. Cf. Lamberts, supra note 91, paras 43–47.
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present and future institutional design not an auxiliary organ of the Parlia-
ment.100
A special issue in this context is the Ombudsman’s relationship to the par-
liamentary petitions committee.101 European citizens and residents enjoy two
parallel rights, namely the right to complain to the Ombudsman and to peti-
tion to the European Parliament (Art. 21 EC; Art. I-10(2) lit. d) and Art. II-
104 CT). Such a two-track model exists in many Member States as well.102
At the EU level, the two remedies are not exactly congruent in scope. On the
one hand, any complaint to the Ombudsman alleging maladministration
could be equally submitted as a petition to the European Parliament. The in-
verse is not true, mainly because the Ombudsman’s mandate does not cover
action of the Member States, whereas, petitions may relate also to Member
States’ implementation of Community law. Many citizens lodge complaints
against Member State action. If these are addressed to the Ombudsman, he
transfers them to the committee on petitions. (A joint decision-procedure on
the admissibility of complaints103 would not be compatible with the legal
limits of the Ombudsman’s mandate.) Conversely, the petitions committee
transfers suitable petitions to the Ombudsman. In fact, the number of trans-
fers is quite low.104
With regard to the field of congruent “jurisdiction” of the Ombudsman
and the committee on petitions, it is generally assumed that the petition track
is more appropriate for political issues. This means that the Ombudsman
should deal, as a rule, with citizens’ individual complaints with little or no
political implications.105 This division of labour is justified by the political
nature of the committee on petitions, and its political experience and influ-
ence which are needed to address matters of principle with political reper-
100. See on the academic debate on this question Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1, at p.
95–96 with further references.
101. See Baviera, “Essai de division de compétences entre le médiateur européen et la
Commission des pétitions du Parlement européen”, in Marias (Ed.), supra note 1, 107–121.
102. See Crespo Allen, op. cit. supra note 56.
103. Suggestion of the European Ombudsman in a speech to the Committee of Petitions
concerning the presentation to the European Parliament of his Annual Report 2001 of 8 April
2002 at p. 4.
104. Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at p. 212.
105. As a rule, the Ombudsman refers those issues which he considers to have intense po-
litical implications to the committee on petitions. For example, complaints relating to the
havary of the oil tanker Prestige, deploring the insufficiency of Community legislation and the
failure of measures were considered by the European Ombudsman to fall outside his mandate.
The citizens were advised to petition to the European Parliament (European Ombudsman Press
Release No. 32/2002 of 13 Dec. 2002).
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cussions.106 Moreover, the European Parliament, elected directly by the Eu-
ropean citizens, enjoys direct democratic legitimacy. In practice, the overlap
of “jurisdictions” plays no significant role.107
A different issue is the question of mutual review of the two bodies. As
mentioned earlier, the European Parliament is not competent to review the
substance of an Ombudsman decision in an individual citizen’s complaint.108
Conversely, a faulty decision of the committee on petitions could – in terms
of the Treaty – be subsumed under “maladministration”. It would then be
within the scope of Ombudsman review, because the committee is – unlike
the Union courts – not explicitly exempt from the Ombudsman’s mandate.
However, the Ombudsman refuses to conduct inquiries on petitions by the
European Parliament, because he does not consider himself as investigator of
the European Parliament.109
4.3. The Ombudsman and the courts
A central issue is the relation between the Ombudsman as a non-judicial re-
dress mechanism and the courts. From the point of view of aggrieved citi-
zens, resort to the Ombudsman may be an attractive alternative to raising a
formal action before a Community or national court.110 It avoids the well-
known disadvantages of judicial procedures, i.e. costs, delay, formality, and
tension. In contrast, the Ombudsman procedure is free of charge, informal
and flexible, swift, and it is non-adversarial. Complainants do not have to
meet any requirements of standing, such as legal interest. Moreover, the
Ombudsman’s standard of review is broader than judicial review and not lim-
ited to pure legality-control. On the other hand, the Ombudsman does not is-
sue binding decisions, and in the event of non-compliance with an
Ombudsman recommendation, no enforcement action or other follow-up
procedure is possible. Another important difference between the Ombuds-
106. Speech by Söderman on 27 Nov. 2002 to the Committee on Petitions of the Chamber
of Deputies of Luxembourg; speech by Söderman on 25 Feb. 2003, supra note 66. See in
scholarship, e.g., Guckelberger, “Das Petitionsrecht zum Europäischen Parlament sowie das
Recht zur Anrufung des Europäischen Bürgerbeauftragten im Europa der Bürger”, 56 DöV
(2003), 829–838, at 838.
107. Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at p. 212.
108. See also in relation to this Lamberts, supra note 91, paras. 43–47.
109. See as a recent random example the decision of the Ombudsman in complaint 1590/
2004/ELB of 25 June 2004.
110. See Davis, “Quasi-Judicial review: The European Ombudsman as an Alternative to
the European Courts” 1 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues (2000), webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/
issue1/davis1.html, visited on 6 Sept. 2004.
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man and the courts is the Ombudsman’s ability to set his own agenda and to
initiate inquiries without having to wait for a complaint.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s individual redress activity resembles
judicial action in some respects. Citizens have “a subjective right to refer to
the Ombudsman complaints”,111 which resembles the fundamental right of
access to courts. As in the judicial realm, legal (administrative) remedies
must be exhausted first, and time-limits apply.112 The Ombudsman examines
first the admissibility and then the merits of a claim, and his inquiry is
bounded by the allegations and claims. Although the Ombudsman does not
often quote his own precedents, he uses ritual formulas which help creating
his own case law. Finally, the Ombudsman procedure is normally public
(similar to a trial), and the Ombudsman is independent, like a judge. Observ-
ers have even criticized the European Ombudsman’s “legalistic” approach,113
which arguably somewhat dilutes the specificity of the Ombudsman as a
means of alternative dispute resolution. Given the fact that the Ombudsman
may in functional terms substitute the courts, and that both forums have spe-
cific advantages and shortcomings, it is laudable that the EC Treaty leaves it
to the citizen to decide which of the two is likely to serve his interests
best.114 Given their functional similarity, it is logical that the two remedies
cannot be pursued at the same time. If a citizen chooses the judiciary, the
Ombudsman proceeding is subsidiary. The Ombudsman may not conduct in-
quiries on facts which are or have been “the subject of legal proceedings”
(Art. 195(1) EC; Art. III-335(1)(2) CT).115 This clause refers not only to
Community courts, but also national courts anywhere in the world.116 More-
over, the European Ombudsman accepts that under Article 220 EC (Art. I-29
CT), the Court of Justice is the primary organ entrusted with legal interpreta-
tion and application of Union law. The Ombudsman follows the case law of
the Union courts, although he does not quote the case law on a regular basis.
111. Lamberts, supra note 85, para 56.
112. Both requirements in Art. 2(4) Statute, supra note 15. However, an own-initiative
inquiry is still possible later.
113. Rawlings, “Engaged elites, citizen action and institutional attitudes in Commission
enforcement”, 6 European Law Journal (2000), 4, at 15 and 17.
114. Lamberts, supra note 85, para 66.
115. See also Art. 1(3) Statute, supra note 15: “The Ombudsman may not intervene in cases
before courts or question of the soundness of a court’s ruling”. Under Art. 2(7) of the Statute,
the Ombudsman has to declare complaints inadmissible when he learns that a legal proceeding
has been started. A different issue is Ombudsman control of the judicial activity as such. Art.
195 EC stipulates that the Ombudsman may not scrutinize the courts, because judicial proceed-
ings are not administration and therefore no “maladministration” is possible.
116. Heede, op. cit. supra note 8, at 591; Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at 230.
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In Söderman’s words: “the jurisprudence of the Courts in Luxembourg …
will safely guide the Ombudsman’s ship on the heavy seas of good and bad
administration.”117
If a citizen chooses resort to the Ombudsman and is not satisfied, subse-
quent judicial remedies remain open in theory.118 In practice, this option is
obstructed by the rule that the time limits for judicial proceedings are not in-
terrupted by complaint to the Ombudsman.119
4.4. The Ombudsman and the Commission
The Ombudsman and the Commission are both non-judicial actors which
are, inter alia, entrusted with a controlling and supervisory function. The
Commission is currently the so-called guardian of the Treaties (Art. 211
EC). Under Article I-26 CT it “shall ensure the application of the Constitu-
tion”. Unlike the Ombudsman, the Commission’s guarantee function is not
limited to the EU administration, but extends to all “branches” of EU gov-
ernment and to the Member States’ application of EU law. In controlling
other parts of the EU administration (not the Commission itself), the Om-
budsman generally accepts the legal assessments of the Commission and
does not seek to replace them by its own judgment.120 The functional balance
between the European Ombudsman and the Ombudsman network on the one
hand and the Commission on the other can best be identified by examining
two salient legal problems.
4.4.1. The Ombudsman as a custodian of the infringement proceedings
Infringement proceedings are the pre-litigation phase of the procedures
for non-compliance lodged by the Commission on the basis of Article 226
117. Söderman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 354.
118. The Ombudsman’s finding of no maladministration is not res iudicata (Harden, op.
cit. supra note 10, at 221). Under Art. 2(5) of the Statute, the Ombudsman may advise the
person lodging the complaint to address it to another authority. However, the Ombudsman is
under no obligation to advise the individual that he may bring an action before Community
courts, to inform him of other legal remedies and of the time-limits he has to observe with
regards to actions before the courts. It is not incumbent on him to advise the complainant to
pursue any particular remedy. Lamberts, supra note 91, paras. 25 and 80. See also Case T-33/
99, Méndez Pinedo v. ECB (order 2d chamber) [2000] ECR-FP-I-A-63 (summary) and II-273
(Spanish original), para 36.
119. Art. 2(6) of the Statute, supra note 15. Case T-33/99, Méndez Pinedo, supra note 118,
para 26.
120. Annual report 1999, at p. 19: “it is therefore likely that in most cases, the Ombudsman
will find no reason, at the end of his inquiry, to question the Commission’s considered interpre-
tation of a legal provision.”
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EC121 (Art. III-360 CT122). This provision empowers the Commission to take
action against a Member State failing to fulfil its “obligation[s] under the
Treaty”, respectively “under the Constitution”. One of these obligations is to
respect the European fundamental rights (either as “general principles of
Community law”, or as explicit guarantees enshrined in the Constitutional
Treaty). The details of the infringement proceedings have been shaped by
Commission practice. The Commission has been eager to preserve the fea-
tures of selectivity, secrecy, and effectiveness.123 Most importantly, the
Commission’s decision as to whether or not to refer a breach of EU law to
the EJC is within its discretion.124 Although the Commission acknowledges
the vital role played by the complainant in detecting infringements of Com-
munity law,125 individuals affected by a breach of Community law have no
procedural or substantive rights vis-à-vis the Commission. They cannot force
the Commission to adopt a particular position, and they can notably not
bring an action of annulment for the Commission’s refusal to take action.126
The underlying view of the nature of the infringement proceeding is that this
procedure is not intended to provide individuals with a means of redress, but
that it is a primarily political mechanism within a “bilateral” relationship be-
tween Union and Member States, for ensuring State compliance.127
121. Definition in Commission’s communication to the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Ombudsman on relations with the complainant in respect of infringements of Community
law, COM (2002) 141 final of 20 March 2002, O.J. 2002, C 244/5, at p. 6 (Principle 1. “Defini-
tions and Scope”).
122. Art. III-360 CT: “If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil
an obligation under the Constitution, it shall deliver an opinion on the matter after giving the
State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not
comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring
the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
123. Harden, “What future for the centralized enforcement of Community law?”, 55 Cur-
rent Legal Problems (2002), 495, at 502–504.
124. See Case C-422/92, Commission v. Germany, [1995] ECR I-1097, para 18; Case C-
191/95, Commission v. Germany, [1998] ECR I-5449, para 46; Case C-212/98, Commission v.
Ireland, [1999] ECR I-8571, para 12.
125. Commission’s communication on relations with the complainant, supra note 121, at p.
5.
126. Actions to this end instituted by individuals against the Commission are dismissed by
the Court. Case C-247/87, Star Fruit v. Commission, [1989] ECR I-291, para 12; Case C-87/
89, Société nationale interprofessionelle de la tomate (Sonito) v. Commission, [1990] ECR I-
1981, para 6.
127. Commission’s communication on relations with the complainant, supra note 121;
Case C-141/02 P, Commission v. max.mobil Telecommunication Service, Opinion of A.G.
Poiares Maduro of 21 Oct. 2004, para 56; in scholarship Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, 3rd ed.
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This is where the Ombudsman comes in.128 Individuals have regularly
complained to him about the Commission’s procedures. Typical grievances
are excessive delay for the processing of complaints, lack of information
about the further treatment, closure of the case without warning or explana-
tion, or suspicions of political interference, which the Ombudsman has criti-
cized in numerous decisions.129 Additionally, the Ombudsman launched his
own initiative inquiry into the infringement procedure.130 Ombudsman pres-
sure131 induced the codification of procedural safeguards in a Commission
Communication in 2002, which improves the transparency, sets time limits,
and offers possibilities for a hearing,132 but which – somewhat inconsistently
(Oxford, 2003), p. 308; Erhart, “Der europäische Bürgerbeauftragte – ausgewählte Rechts-
fragen”, 5 Journal für Rechtspolitik (1997), 278, at 280.
128. See on the legal position of the individual in infringement proceedings and on the
Ombudsman’s role in this context Mastroianni, “The Enforcement Procedure under Article 169
and the Powers of the European Commission: Quis Custodiet Custodes?”, 1 EPL (1995), 535–
539 (arguing for a reform of the infringement procedure, notably for transparency); Erhart, op.
cit. supra note 127, at 280–285; Kunzlik, “The enforcement of EU environmental law: Art.
169, the Ombudsman and the Parliament”, 6 European Environmental Law Review (1997), 46–
52; Bonnor, (2000) op. cit. supra note 88, 47–50.
129. Harden, “What future for the centralized enforcement”, supra note 123, at p. 499; OI
303/97/PD, decision of 13 Oct. 1997, para 3. Recent random examples: Complaint 2185/2002/
IP of 27 April 2004 (with critical remark on the Commission’s undue delay in pursuing its
inquiries); complaint 841/2003/(FA)OV, decision of 10 May 2004 (no maladministration in
the way the Commission supervised the transposition of Community insurance law into na-
tional legislation; complaint 701/2003/IP of 9 June 2004 (with critical remark on the Commis-
sion’s failure to register a complaint); complaint 1671/20027GG, decision of 21 June 2004
(settlement after Commission’s acceptance of draft recommendation); complaint 2333/2003/
GG, decision of 19 May 2004 with critical remark on Commission’s failure to deal with the
complainant’s infringement complaint within a reasonable period of time (here: 5 months de-
lay).
130. See Decision of the European Ombudsman in the own initiative inquiry OI 303/07/PD
into the Commission’s administrative procedures in relation to citizens’ complaints about na-
tional authorities of 13 Oct. 1997. This initiative has been triggered by Newbury Bypass, Com-
plaint 206/27.10.95/HS/UK and 25 other complaints against the Commission, Annual Report
1996, 58–66. In this case, 26 complaints had alleged maladministration by the Commission in
deciding not to open infringement proceedings against the UK, which had not carried out an
environmental impact assessment on a road project.
131. The Ombudsman had suggested that the Commission adopt a code to handle Art. 226
complaints. See speech by Söderman to the European Convention on 25 June 2002.
132. Commission’s communication on relations with the complainant, supra note 121.
Safeguards comprise, inter alia, the recording of complaints, the acknowledgment of receipt,
the furnishing of a standard complaint form, information in writing after each Commission
decision of the steps taken, a right to ask for explanation or clarification by the Commission
officials on the spot (!) and at the citizen’s own expense. The document also sets a time limit of
one year as a general rule for the investigation of claims. Complainants will be informed in
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– explicitly refuses to acknowledge any subjective legal rights of complain-
ants.133
However, even under the premise that the “objective” character of the in-
fringement proceeding, manifested in the Commission’s discretion and the
absence of a substantive legal position of the individual, precludes an action-
able legal right of citizens, the Commission’s discretionary power is in a le-
gal community not unlimited. Otherwise it would amount to mere arbitrary
power.134 The role of the Ombudsman in this context is to scrutinize the lim-
its of Commission discretion.135 General limits of discretion as established
by the case law of the Court of Justice are consistency, good faith, avoidance
of discrimination, compliance with the principles of proportionality, equality
and legitimate expectations and the respect of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.136 Moreover, it can be argued that the complainant in infringement
proceedings is de facto party to an administrative proceeding and that conse-
quently the normal rules and principles of administrative procedure, such as
openness and the duty to give reasons, apply.137 In any case, the Commis-
sion’s Communication of 2002 has spelled out the above-mentioned specific
procedural guarantees.
The Communication is a mere soft law document. Nevertheless, the Com-
mission acknowledges that non-compliance with that document will consti-
tute maladministration and may give rise to an affected citizen’s complaint to
the European Ombudsman.138 This is logically consistent, because malad-
writing of the decision taken by the Commission in connection with their complaint (issuing of
a formal notice opening proceedings against the Member State or decision to close the case).
Prior to closing the case, the Commission will give written notice to the complainant setting out
the grounds and inviting the complainant to submit any comments within four weeks. Finally,
Commission decisions on infringement cases are published within one week.
133. The Communication insists on the “bilateral nature of the infringement procedure”,
Commission’s communication on relations with the complainant, supra note 121, at p. 6.
134. See Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (80) 2 adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on 11 March 1980, concerning the exercise of discretionary powers by administra-
tive authorities, available via www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/, visited on 15 Sept. 2004.
135. Leading case is the Ombudsman decision on complaint 995/98OV – Thessaloniki
Metro, decision of 30 Jan. 2001. In this decision, the ombudsman did not question the existence
of discretion, but recalled that discretionary power is not the same as dictatorial or arbitrary
power. An institution must act within the limits of its legal authority when making a discretion-
ary decision (see id., esp. paras 1.7–1.9.).
136. Cf. Ombudsman decision Thessaloniki Metro, supra note 135, para 1.8.
137. Harden, op. cit. supra note 123, at 512 and 508. This conception does not necessarily
imply a so-far unknown actionable citizen’s right to force the Commission to take action.
138. Commission’s communication on relations with the complainant, supra note 121, at p.
8, principle 14: “Where a complainant considers that, in handling his/her complaint, the Com-
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ministration is broader than illegality and because complaints to the Om-
budsman do not need to be based on a claim of a violation of individual and
“hard” legal rights.
4.4.2. National Ombudsmen as an alternative to Article 226 proceedings?
The prospect that the Commission will be overwhelmed with cases due to
the Union’s enlargement, has led observers to consider national ombudsmen
as an alternative to the Commission’s infringement proceedings.139 This sug-
gestion is based on the assumption that the administrative stage of the in-
fringement proceedings and Ombudsman proceedings are functionally
interchangeable non-judicial remedies, which is according to the traditional
conception of an “objective” and “bilateral” infringement procedure not the
case. However, the affected citizens’ themselves probably do not share the
traditional view, but instead apply to the Commission because they seek an
informal and flexible remedy. In this perspective, “Art. 226 [appears] as a
quasi-Ombudsman remedy.”140 To address national ombudsmen instead of
the “quasi-Ombudsman” might be especially attractive for citizens who com-
plain of disregard for their European fundamental rights. It is therefore laud-
able that the Commission in its Communication of 2002 pledges, “where
necessary”, to “inform the complainant of any possible alternative form of
redress, such as recourse to national courts, the European Ombudsman, a na-
tional Ombudsman or any other national or international complaints proce-
dure.”141 It would be even more effective for the Commission to forward the
complaint directly to the alternative mechanisms. Granting priority to local,
non-judicial remedies would realize the principle of subsidiarity in the field
of law enforcement and would avoid overloading the Commission.142
4.4.3. Conclusion: Ombudsman pressure towards a change of paradigm in
infringement proceedings
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the Ombudsman’s activity has had
some impact on the quality of infringement proceedings. It is in part due to
the Ombudsman that the Commission has established procedural rules which
mission has been guilty of maladministration by failing to follow any of the above measures,
he/she may refer the matter to the European Ombudsman”.
139. See notably Harden, op. cit. supra note 123, at 512–514.
140. Harden, ibid., at 506.
141. See Principle 4, “Acknowledgement of receipt” in the Commission’s communication
on relations with the complainant, supra note 121, at p. 6. This clause follows the European
Ombudsman’s suggestion in OI 303/97/PD, decision of 13 Oct. 1997, para 12.
142. Harden, op. cit., supra note 123, at 512; Diamandouros, supra note 5.
722 Peters CML Rev. 2005
de facto grant various procedural rights to complainants, while still paying
lip-service to the principle of “bilateralism” and “objectivity” of the in-
fringement proceedings. Similarly, the Commission’s acknowledgment that
ombudsmen proceedings are a viable alternative to the Article 226-track im-
plies a novel conception of the infringement proceedings.
Most importantly, Ombudsman scrutiny of the limits of discretion moves
the individual complainant somewhat into the foreground. Officially, the
Ombudsman scrutinizes in the Article 226 context only the procedural safe-
guards guaranteeing that the handling of citizens’ complaints to the Com-
mission is carried out under due regard for the above-mentioned standards
and principles, regardless of the nature of the action to be undertaken by the
Commission. Formally, the Ombudsman’s scope of inquiry does not there-
fore include the Commission’s discretionary decision to launch the judicial
stage of the Article 226 procedure.143 However, it can be doubted whether
the procedural issues can be neatly separated from the question which type
of action is appropriate. Arguably, the Ombudsman’s approach focusing on
procedural propriety also touches on the substance of the Commission deci-
sion. The ostensibly formal character of control does not guarantee the “neu-
trality” of the Ombudsman’s intervention.144 In the long run, we may come
to acknowledge that the “sound administration of justice and the proper ap-
plication of the [European Constitution]” require “that natural or legal per-
sons who request the Commission to find an infringement of those rules
should be able, if their request is rejected either wholly or in part, to institute
proceedings in order to protect their legitimate interests”, as the Court of
First Instance put it (albeit limited to the context of competition rules).145
Ombudsman activity has contributed to this development.
143. See Ombudsman decision 161/99/IJH of 13 Sept. 2000, para 1.5.; Ombudsman deci-
sion on complaint 1194/2000/JMA of 7 June 201 para 1.5.
144. Magnette, supra note 4, at pp. 943–944. According to Rawlings, op. cit. supra note
113, at p. 6, the Ombudsman is a means of side-stepping the failure of the Court to police the
Art. 226 process effectively.
145. Case T-54/99, max.mobil v. Commission, [2002] ECR II-313, paras. 54 and 56. The
CFI limited this dictum to the special infringement proceedings in the field of public undertak-
ings under Art. 86(3) EC and distinguished the proceedings under Art. 226 EC. However, the
A.G. interpreted this judgment as a general attack on the Commission’s discretionary power
and feared the advent of subjective rights of the individual in infringement proceedings (Case
C-141/02 P, max.mobil, supra note 127, Opinion, para 55).
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5. The European Ombudsman and European constitutional principles
This part analyses the Ombudsman’s contribution to the safeguarding and
implementation of basic constitutional principles and their emanations. The
Constitutional Treaty mentions the Ombudsman in Part I, Title II (“Funda-
mental Rights and Citizenship of the Union”) and in Part I, Title VI “The
democratic life of the Union”). This rightly signals that the Ombudsman is
supposed to foster both the Union’s commitments to the rule of law (includ-
ing human rights, access to justice, and good administration), and its demo-
cratic aspirations (linked to European citizenship and transparency).146
5.1. The Ombudsman and the rule of law
The EU is “a Community based on the rule of law”.147 “Rule of law” here
means that the EU is governed by the law and not by power. The activity of
all European bodies must be duly authorized by legal rules, and effective
remedies must be provided against illegal action. The redress function of the
European Ombudsman is one building block of that European rule of law.148
His activity is directed at preventing illegality and remedying infringements.
He thereby contributes, alongside other institutions, such as the Community
courts or the Commission, to safeguarding the lawfulness of Union adminis-
tration. In this context, two issues deserve scrutiny: first, which types of
remedies are desirable under the European rule of law, and second, can the
Ombudsman’s activities themselves be subject to judicial control?
5.1.1. A chapter on remedies in the Constitutional Treaty?
The rule of law requires remedies. The European Ombudsman proposed to
the Convention to insert a chapter on remedies into the Constitutional Treaty.
He even considered this to be his “first and foremost” objective in the pro-
cess of constitution-making.149 That chapter should have set out the possi-
bilities for judicial and non-judicial redress when Community rights are not
146. See on the promotion of these constitutional principles the Resolution adopted by the
national ombudsmen (2003), supra note 80. See also Diamandouros, supra note 5.
147. Opinion 1/91 on the draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and
the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of
the European Economic Area, [1991] ECR I-6079, para 21.
148. Heede, op. cit. supra note 8, at 588; Guckelberger, op. cit., supra note 1, at p. 13; What
can the European Ombudsman do for you?: A guide for Citizens (Strasbourg, 2002), at p. 21.
149. Speech by Söderman to the European Convention on 24 June 2002; see also his speech
on 25 Feb. 2003, supra note 66.
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respected, should have enumerated judicial remedies (proceedings in the
Court of Justice and in national courts and tribunals, the right to petition the
European Parliament, and the right to complain to the European Ombuds-
man), and finally should have mentioned the right to complain to an inde-
pendent Ombudsman or body dealing with petitions in each Member
State.150 A controversial element of the Ombudsman’s proposal on remedies
was the power of referral. The European Ombudsman suggested that he
could be charged with referring to the ECJ cases of principle involving fun-
damental rights.151 This idea draws on the Spanish, Portuguese and Austrian
examples, where the national ombudsmen can refer matters to their constitu-
tional court.152 It was not taken up by the Convention.
Another problematic aspect was the Ombudsman’s proposition to mention
non-judicial remedies in the Member States. The European Ombudsman had
regularly endorsed this idea in previous years.153 His insistence can be ex-
plained by the fact that reliance on and improvement of the network of na-
tional ombudsmen is important for the European Ombudsman, because of
his limited mandate. However, the Union does not possess the authority to
prescribe to the Member States which concrete types of remedies they must
establish in their national legal order. It is therefore prudent that the Consti-
tutional Treaty merely states that “Member States shall provide remedies suf-
ficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union
law” (Art. I-29(2) CT). Apart from this provision, the idea of a chapter on
remedies found no resonance in the Constitutional Treaty.
Finally, the Ombudsman propagated in the Constitutional Convention the
introduction of an explicit right to complain to the Ombudsman.154 The rea-
son for this request is that Article 21(2) EC merely states that citizens “may
apply to the Ombudsman”. This option is not formulated as a subjective right
(in contrast to the right to petition to the European Parliament under Art.
150. CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76, supra note 66.
151. The proposal was: “If the European Ombudsman considers, after carrying out an in-
quiry in accordance with [Article 195 EC], that a Member State or a Community institution or
body is failing to respect a fundamental right binding in Community law, he may bring the
matter before the Court of Justice.” CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76, supra note 66.
152. See Crespo Allen, supra note 56, at p. 8.
153. See already the Annual Report 1998, at p. 11: “Furthermore, the right to complain to
national ombudsmen and to petition to parliaments in cases of conflicts with the administration
involving Community law should also be mentioned in the Treaty. Each Member State should
have an obligation to ensure that its legal structure includes an effective and appropriate non
judicial body to which citizens may apply or this purpose”.
154. CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76, supra note 66; CONV 466/02 CONTRIB 176, supra
note 13; speech by Söderman to the European Convention on 8 Nov. 2002.
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21(1) EC), and much less as a fundamental or human right. Fortunately, the
Court of First Instance interpreted this provision, despite its loose language,
as conferring on European citizens and residents a “subjective right to refer
to the Ombudsman”.155 It is laudable that the Constitutional Treaty now
makes this qualification explicit by mentioning the right to apply to the Om-
budsman as one of the rights linked to citizenship (Art. I-10(2)(d) CT).
Moreover, this right is upgraded as a human right forming part of the Funda-
mental Rights Charter as embodied in the Constitutional Treaty (Art. II-103
CT). This European fundamental right has three components: the Ombuds-
man must receive and take note of the complaint and must respond to the
citizen. Citizens are not entitled to an investigation. Conversely, the Ombuds-
man is not bound to reach a specific result or a solution, but merely under an
obligation to use his best endeavours.156
5.1.2. Judicial review of Ombudsman activity?
This section deals with the question: who watches the watchdog? The Om-
budsman himself is a body established by the Treaty. The European rule of
law requires that the Ombudsman himself, as all other Union bodies, acts un-
der, not above the law. Although the Ombudsman enjoys wide discretion,
there are limits (which have so far never been overstepped by the Ombuds-
man). Moreover, the Ombudsman himself forms part of the Union adminis-
tration. This means that he himself must comply with the requirements of
good administration.157 For instance, the procedure before the Ombudsman
must be completed within a reasonable time, to be determined according to
the circumstances of the case.158 However, the unquestionable subjection of
the Ombudsman to the law as matter of substance is distinct from the proce-
dural question of justiciability. This means that the rule of law does not
strictly require judicial review of all aspects of the Ombudsman’s activity.
To begin with, the Ombudsman’s findings in a case should not be subject
to citizens’ actions for annulment under Article 230 EC (Art. III-365 CT) or
for failure to act (Art. 232 EC; Art. 367 CT). A formal explanation for the
non-availability of these actions is that in both Treaty provisions, the Om-
budsman is not mentioned as a possible defendant. If, arguendo, the Om-
155. Lamberts, supra note 85, para 56.
156. Cf. Lamberts, supra note 91, paras 50 and 82. Consequently, a complainant can not
argue that the Ombudsman has not fulfilled the mission entrusted to him on the sole grounds
that the Ombudsman concluded that it was not possible to find a solution.
157. Lamberts, supra note 85, para 76.
158. See Art. 17 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (supra note 83).
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budsman could be associated to the European Parliament from a functional
perspective, an affected citizen might think of claiming illegal action or fail-
ure to act on the part of the Parliament. However, both under Article 230(4)
EC and under Article 232(3) EC, a natural or legal person can only institute
proceedings relating to acts which are (or should be) addressed to him or
which concern (or would concern) him as a third party directly and individu-
ally.159 These conditions are not satisfied in the context of the Ombudsman’s
activities. If the Ombudsman finds maladministration, he reports to the Par-
liament and possibly makes recommendations. Both the report and the rec-
ommendations are legally non-binding. Moreover, these acts do not concern
the citizen, who is technically a third party, “directly and individually”. Re-
port and recommendation are therefore not challengeable acts in terms of Ar-
ticle 230(4) EC (Art. III-365 CT) and correspondingly not the possible
object of a proceeding for failure to act under Article 232(3) EC (Art. III-
367 CT).160
Immunity of the Ombudsman’s substantive findings from review by the
courts is plausible also from a policy perspective. Citizens can choose be-
tween judicial remedies and the Ombudsman. They have the opportunity to
institute legal proceedings directly. The principle of effective legal protection
does not demand a redoubling of fora. Just as the Ombudsman cannot review
the substance of judicial proceedings, the courts should not review his find-
ings in substance. Otherwise, the idea of alternative means of dispute settle-
ment is betrayed.161
A different solution might be appropriate with regard to purely procedural
decisions of the Ombudsman. Article 230 EC could be construed extensively
so that the Ombudsman’s decision to reject a complaint as inadmissible
could be actionable. Thereby the Ombudsman would be treated on the same
footing as the EP when it rejects a petition as inadmissible.162
A different issue is actions for damages founded on the Union’s non-contrac-
tual liability as a result of the alleged mishandling of a complaint by the Om-
budsman. The Court has always considered the action for damages under
Article 288 EC (Art. III-431(2) CT) to be an autonomous form of action
159. Art. III-365 and III-367 CT add to the current Treaty provision regulatory acts which
do not entail implementing measures to the actionable acts. But this does not alter the situation
with regard to the Ombudsman activity, which is not regulatory.
160. Case T-103/99, Associazone delle Cantine Sociali Venete v. European Ombudsman
and European Parliament, judgment of 22 May 2000, [2000] ECR II-4165, esp. paras 41–51.
(Appeal to ECJ withdrawn). See also Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at 220–21.
161. Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at 222; Guckelberger, op, cit. supra note 1, at pp. 143–
144.
162. Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 143.
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(whose admissibility therefore does not pave the way for other types of ac-
tion). In the context of an action for damages, it is irrelevant whether the
critical act is legally binding or not. It is therefore consistent that the ECJ
has, in a recent ruling, declared an action for damages against the European
Ombudsman admissible in principle.163 The Court justified this finding with
a standard effet utile argument: to deny the availability of this type of action
with regard to the Ombudsman would render ineffective the procedure pro-
vided for in Article 235 EC (Art. III-370 CT) conferring jurisdiction on the
Court of Justice in disputes relating to compensation for damages.164
However, the Court’s review in an action for damages is quite limited, be-
cause according to well-established case law, a right to reparation arises only
from sufficiently serious breaches of Community/Union law. This condition
will only rarely be met in the context of the Ombudsman activity, because
the Ombudsman enjoys a very wide discretion as regards the merits of com-
plaints and the way he deals with them. Only a flagrant, manifest breach of
the Ombudsman’s obligations or a grave disregard of the limits on his discre-
tion would constitute a serious breach of Community/Union law in terms of
Article 288 EC (Art. III-431 CT). Consequently, only in very exceptional cir-
cumstances will a citizen be able to demonstrate that the Ombudsman has
committed a sufficiently serious breach in the performance of his duties
likely to cause damages.165 This solution represents a reasonable compro-
mise between respect for the rule of law on the one hand and consideration
for the Ombudsman’s specific functions on the other. Moreover, judicial re-
view of the activities of the Ombudsman does not interfere with the powers
of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Ombudsman, because these do not
amount to a review of his performance in dealing with citizens’ com-
plaints.166 And finally, (limited) judicial review of the Ombudsman does not
call into question the Ombudsman’s independence, because a finding of li-
ability leading to damage occasioned by the Ombudsman’s activity concerns
not the personal liability of the Ombudsman, but that of the Union.167
163. Lamberts, supra note 91.
164. Ibid. para 61.
165. Ibid., para 52.
166. Ibid., paras 43–47.
167. Ibid. para 48.
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5.2. The Ombudsman and fundamental rights
5.2.1. The Ombudsman’s enforcement of Charter rights
European fundamental rights were first codified in the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR). The European Ombudsman was both an ob-
server in the Charter Convention and able to address that Convention.168 On
7 December 2000, the Charter was “welcomed” by the European Council in
Nice.169 Despite the Charter’s lack of binding legal force, the Ombudsman
pledged from the outset on to “mak[e] … the Charter a living reality”.170 He
has made frequent reference to it in his speeches and Annual Reports and has
criticized EU institutions for their failure to observe many rights contained
in the Charter.171 Most importantly, the Ombudsman has used his own-initia-
tive power for a pro-active approach in enforcing Charter rights. Own initia-
tives have related – inter alia – to age limits for EU recruitment
competitions,172 to parental leave for EU officials,173 to judicial protection in
tender procedures,174 and to the freedom of expression of Commission offi-
cials.175 In November 2003, the Ombudsman opened an own-initiative in-
quiry into the subject of the integration of persons with disabilities (Art.
II-81 CT) with regard to recruitment, careers, working environment etc. in
relation to the Commission.176
Moreover, the Ombudsman has consistently taken the view that failure to
apply the Charter is maladministration, independently of the Charter’s status
as soft law.177 This reasoning is supported by the fact that the fundamental
168. The Convention functioned from 17 Dec. 1999 to 2 Oct. 2000. See e.g. speech by the
European Ombudsman on 2 Feb. 2000: Public Hearing on the draft Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.
169. O.J. 2000, C 364/1.
170. The European Ombudsman, What can the Ombudsman do for you?, supra note 148 at
p. 11.
171. See e.g. Decision on complaint 1532/202/GG against the Commission (age and sex
discrimination), Annual Report 2003, at p. 190–196.
172. Art. 21 CFR; Art. II-81 CT. See OI/2/2001/(BB)OV, see Annual Report 2002, p. 207.
173. Art. 33(2) CFR; Art. II-93 CT. See OI/4/2001/ME, see Annual Report 2002, p. 201.
174. Art. 47 CFR; Art. II-197 CT. See OI/2/2002/IJH.
175. Art. 11 CFR; Art. II-71 CT. See OI/1/2001/GG, see Annual Report 2002, p. 196.
176. OI/3/2003/JMA. This inquiry was limited to the Commission, being the most impor-
tant actor in the EU’s institutional framework, but may eventually to be expanded to other
European institutions, www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/disabilities/en/default.htm, visited on 31
Aug. 2004. See summary in Annual Report 2003, at p. 35.
177. Speech by Söderman on 25 Feb. 2003, supra note 66; Diamandouros, supra note 5.
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right to good administration (which is the other side of maladministration)
comprises “fair” treatment (Art. 41 CFR; Art. II-101(1) CT).178 And “fair”
treatment, in turn, arguably includes respect for all fundamental rights.179 In
this perspective, the principle of “fairness” functions as a transmission belt
which allows the Ombudsman to control the observance of all fundamental
rights by the European administration (not by the legislative and judicial
branch). The qualification of disregard for fundamental rights as maladmin-
istration does not turn on the formal legal status of the Charter of fundamen-
tal rights, because maladministration covers legal and non-legal errors. The
Ombudsman’s reasoning therefore does not necessarily imply that he has
treated the Charter of Fundamental Rights as binding law since its proclama-
tion.180
In any case, one of the four main proposals of the Ombudsman in the
Constitutional Convention was that the Charter should be legally binding.181
This idea was realized by incorporating the Charter in Part II of the Constitu-
tional Treaty. However, the Ombudsman’s interventions were not the princi-
pal driving force of this reform. As widely expected, the Convention’s
Working Group on Fundamental Rights had come to the same conclusion.182
In this context, it is crucial to realize that the Ombudsman’s power to enforce
European fundamental rights finds its limits in his mandate (restricted to
maladministration by Union bodies). Although in theory, both Union bodies
and the Member States acting as agents must observe the European funda-
mental rights (Art. 51(1) CFR; Art. II-111(1) CT),183 in practice Member
178. See for a discussion of the still unclear meaning of “fairness”, Lais, “Das Recht auf
eine gute Verwaltung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des Euro-
päischen Gerichtshofs”, 5 Zeitschrift für Europäische Studien (ZEuS) (2002), 447, at
p. 462.
179. Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 106, at p. 836; Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1, at
p. 116
180. But see Craig and de Búrca, supra note 127, at pp. 362 and 390.
181. Ombudsman contribution CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76, supra note 66; see also the
speech by Söderman on 25 Feb. 2003, supra note 66. See also the Athens Resolution of na-
tional ombudsmen in Europe of 7–8 April 2003 (supra note 80), demanding to “facilitate the
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights”.
182. Final Report of the Working Group II on Fundamental Rights of 22 Oct. 2002, CONV
354/02.
183. Under Art. 51(1) CFR; Art. II-111(1) CT, “[t]he provisions of this Charter are ad-
dressed to the Institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. …” This
provision is based on previous case law of ECJ; see Case C-292/97, Kjell Karlsson, [2000]
ECR I-2737, para 37.
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States implement Union law and consequently risk infringing Charter rights.
It is widely agreed that Article 51(1) CFR covers every situation in which
Member States’ acts are occasioned by the Union, whether precisely deter-
mined by Union law or not. Charter rights must also be observed by the na-
tional authorities when the Member States enjoy discretion with regard to the
means of implementation of European directives (i.e. framework laws in
terms of Art. I-33 CT).184 Most importantly, the “implementation” of Union
law in terms of Article 51 CFR includes the application and interpretation of
(formally) domestic law implementing European framework laws, because
otherwise a coherent standard of European fundamental rights protection
could not be achieved.185 This very wide field of Member States’ activity
cannot be scrutinized by the European Ombudsman. His review of funda-
mental rights is limited to the far smaller field of direct Union administra-
tion. Here, the individual citizen’s complaint to the European Ombudsman is
a non-judicial alternative to the review of legality by the EJC under Article
230(4) EC (Art. III-365(4) CT), in which an individual can allege breaches
of European fundamental rights by Union bodies under relatively restrictive
conditions.186
In the more relevant case of non-observation of European fundamental
rights by national authorities, it is primarily up to the Member States them-
selves to provide for effective remedies.187 European fundamental rights are
directly applicable by national courts, so that alleged violations can be dealt
with there, eventually guided by an ECJ ruling in response to questions of
interpretation via Article 234 EC (Art. III-369 CT). Moreover, almost all
Member States offer non-judicial remedies (e.g. national ombudsmen, who
may also deal with fundamental rights questions). A different option for an
individual aggrieved by disregard of the European Charter is to address her-
184. A different and notoriously controversial question is the parallel or additional obser-
vation of “national” fundamental rights by the Member States’ authorities (and access to na-
tional courts alleging a violation of a “national” fundamental right).
185. Meyer (Ed.), Kommentar zur Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union
(Baden-Baden, 2003), Art. 51 Charter, paras 25–28. Diamandouros, supra note 5.
186. The critical act must be addressed to that person or must be of direct and individual
concern to him or her. Art. III-365 CT adds regulatory acts which do not entail implementing
measures.
187. See Case C-50/00P, Union de Pequeños Agricultores, [2000] ECR I-6677, para 42:
national courts are required to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing the exer-
cise of rights of action in a way that enables persons to challenge before the courts the legality
of any decision or other national measure relative to the application to them of a Community
act.
Ombudsman 731
self not to national bodies, but to the Union, namely to the Commission in
order to trigger an infringement procedure against her Member State under
Article 226 EC (Art. III-360 CT). (See supra, 4.4.)
Finally, the Commission installed in 2002 a Network of independent ex-
perts to monitor respect for the European Charter of Fundamental Rights in
the Member States.188 The Network’s main tasks are to draft annual reports
on the state of fundamental rights practice in the EU based on national re-
ports of the experts, to give opinions on specific questions (e.g. on unions
between unmarried partners and same-sex marriages) on request of the Com-
mission, and to assist the Commission and the Parliament to develop a Euro-
pean Union policy on fundamental rights. Moreover, the European Council
decided in December 2003 to create a European Human Rights Agency and
to that effect extend the mandate of the current European Monitoring Centre
on Racism and Xenophobia in Vienna. The projected independent Agency is
supposed to collect human rights data and analyse them with a view to defin-
ing Union policy in this field.189 It is important that neither the Network nor
the Agency provide for individual redress. However, their preventive func-
tions indirectly serve this objective, too. Overall, the EU does not suffer
from lacking remedies for fundamental rights violation, but offers a host of
overlapping and probably even competing forums.
5.2.2. Accession of the EU to human rights instruments
The European Ombudsman proposed in the Constitutional Convention that
the Union should not only accede to the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), but also to fur-
ther international agreements for the protection and promotion of human
rights.190 The Ombudsman welcomed the possibility for the Union to accede
188. europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/index_en.htm, visited on 5 Jan. 2005.
189. Conclusions of the Representatives of the Member States, meeting at Head of Govern-
ment level in Brussels on 13 Dec. 2003, ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/
78398.pdf, visited on 19 Oct. 2004. The plan is to amend Council Regulation (EC) 1035/97 of 2
June 1997, O.J. L 1997, 151/1, the legal basis of the current Monitoring Centre. See also the
Communication from the Commission COM (2004) 693 final of 25 Oct. 2004, in which the
Commission summarizes the state of affairs and announces a proposal for a regulation relating
to the Agency in 2005.
190. Proposed by the Ombudsman at various occasions. See CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76,
supra note 66; Amendment Form: Suggestion for amendment of Art. 5(2) by Söderman;
speech of 4 Oct. 2002 before Working Group II; speech by Söderman on 25 Feb. 2003, supra
note 66; speech to the Convention on 27/28 Feb. 2003; already at an academic conference in
1998 (European Ombudsman, Press Release of 21 Oct. 1998).
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191. The Ombudsman argued that the question of whether the Union should accede to other
human rights agreements is a matter of policy. The Constitution should leave that option open
and not foreclose it. Explanation on Amendment Form: Suggestion for amendment of Art. 5(2)
by Söderman.
192. See most explicitly Baviera, “Les pétitions au Parlement européen et le Médiateur
européen”, 445 RMC (Feb. 2001), 129, at 135; Juvénal, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 359.
193. Speech by Diamandouros to the European Convention on 24 April 2003.
194. Heede, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 588.
195. Kirchheiner, “The ideological foundations of the ombudsman institution”, in Caiden
vol. 1, supra note 60, 23, at p. 23.
196. Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 106, at p. 838.
197. Marias, “The European Ombudsman: Competences and relations with the other com-
to the ECHR, but feared that a constitutional provision on this issue would
prevent the Union from other accessions.191 The Convention did not take se-
riously the fears of the Ombudsman and chose not to mention any other hu-
man rights instrument besides the ECHR. Under Article I-9(2) CT, “[t]he
Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. …”. In the Draft Constitution of 2003,
this policy issue had only been formulated in a purely hortatory clause (“The
Union shall seek accession”). It is laudable that the Constitution spells out a
clear obligation to accede. This provision does not rule out future accessions
to other human rights instruments.
5.3. The Ombudsman and democracy
The Ombudsman is intended to foster the principle of democracy in the
Union,192 including the institution of European citizenship. Historically, the
ombudsman institution has always been conceived in the context of democ-
racy. Consequently, the establishment of ombudsmen in the accession States
formerly under communist rule was an important element of the transition to
democracy.193 The Ombudsman institution helps making the democratic idea
a political reality, because it is a mechanism to secure the accountability of
officials towards the citizens.194 It can contribute to the individual’s feeling
of security, which is a conditio sine qua non for a sound democracy.195
Moreover, the Ombudsman entertains a dialogue with the citizens and
thereby contributes to the openness of the Union and to closeness to the citi-
zens.196 His parliamentary appointment or election confers on him some de-
gree of democratic legitimacy as well.
The establishment of the office of a European Ombudsman was linked to
the creation of an European citizenship by the Treaty of Maastricht.197 The
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Ombudsman is a special body responsible for safeguarding citizens’ rights.
Most importantly, “[t]he right of citizens to have recourse to the Ombudsman
is an integral part of citizenship of the Union”,198 alongside the right to peti-
tion the European Parliament (Art. 21 EC). As already mentioned, this right
is even mentioned twice in the Constitutional treaty, first in the comprehen-
sive article on citizenship (Art. I-10 CT), and second as a fundamental right
in the European Charter as embodied in the Treaty (Art. II-103 CT).
5.4. The Ombudsman and transparency
It is well know that European political and administrative action has been,
despite the programmatic introductory clause of Article 1 TEU (“… deci-
sions [in the Union] are taken as openly as possible”), notoriously opaque.
However, transparency is an indispensable condition of a functioning democ-
racy. Without transparency, citizens cannot give an informed consent to gov-
ernment action, cannot discuss or criticize it in a well-founded manner, and
cannot intervene promptly in the political process.199 Transparency is of
course also linked to the rule of law, because that constitutional principle re-
quires that citizens can easily obtain clear and precise information about
their rights and duties. Conscious of this problem, the European governments
promised in the Laeken Declaration of 2001 to increase the transparency of
the institutions.200 Since 2001, the Transparency Regulation regulates public
access to documents of the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission.201
Moreover, the Regulation establishes short time limits for the European Par-
liament, Council and Commission to react to applications for access to docu-
ments. Only recently, the institutions accepted the Ombudsman’s suggestion
that in the event of a citizen’s complaint to the Ombudsman against the
institution’s refusal to grant access, the time-limit for the institution to give
an opinion should be shortened from three to two months.202 Both the Com-
munity institutions and bodies”, in id. (Ed.), op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 71; Tierney, op. cit.
supra note 12, at p. 528; see also Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at 208.
198. Lamberts, supra note 85, para 50.
199. Lodge, “Transparency and democratic legitimacy”, 32 JCMS (1994), 343–368.
200. Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union of 15 Dec. 2001, Part II:
Challenges and Reforms in Renewed Union: “The Union needs to become more democratic,
more transparent and more efficient.” gov.be/europ/en_decla_laken.htm, visited on 5 Jan.
2005.
201. Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council re-
garding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (O.J.
2001, L 145/43).
202. See press release No. 21/2004 of 20 July 2004.
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mission203 and the Council204 have adopted rules for the application of the
Transparency Regulation. Under Article 8(3) of that Regulation, refusal of
access or failure to reply entitles the applicant “to institute court proceedings
and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the relevant provisions
of the EC Treaty.”
This entitlement is of high practical relevance. Year after year, the most
frequent type of maladministration found in Ombudsman proceedings is lack
of transparency (including refusal of access to documents).205 Not surpris-
ingly, of the eight Special Reports by the European Ombudsman to the Euro-
pean Parliament so far published, three Reports deal with public access to
documents.206 Moreover, the Ombudsman enshrined the duty to provide
members of the public with the information that they request in Article 22 of
the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour.207 Nevertheless, the
European Ombudsman’s Annual Report 2003 is still full of cases dealing
with denied access to documents of the Council, the Parliament, the Com-
mission, the European Central Bank and even the Convention.
In the Constitutional Convention, the European Ombudsman submitted
two pertinent proposals. The first was that the right of public access should
apply to documents of all the Union institutions.208 This proposal was fully
adopted.209 The second proposal was to include in Article 1 of the Constitu-
203. Commission Decision of 5 Dec. 2001 amending its rules of procedure, notified under
document number C (2001) 3714, L 345/94, Annex: Detailed rules for the application of Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1049/2001. Art. 1(3) of these rules precludes resort to the Ombudsman for
citizens of third countries not residing in a Member State (in conformity with Art. 195 EC).
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_345/l_34520011229en00940098.pdf, visited on 24
Aug. 2004.
204. Council Decision of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, O.J. L
106/22, Art. 10 and Annex II. ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/6/21/Councils%20rules%
20of%20procedure.pdf, visited on 24 Aug. 2004.
205. In 2003, 28% of the complaints alleged lack of transparency, see Annual Report 2003,
supra note 13, Annex 3.2. at p. 321.
206. Special Report of 15 Dec. 1997 (C4–0157/98, O.J. 1998 C 44/9) following the own
initiative inquiry into public access to documents held by Community institutions (616/
PUBAC//F/IJH, Annual Report 1996, 80), responding Resolution of the EP of 16 July 1998 in
O.J. 1998 C 292/170; Special Report following complaint 917/2000/GG of 30 Nov. 2001 (ac-
cess to Council documents concerning justice and home affairs); Special Report following
complaint 1542/2000/(PB)SM of 12 Dec. 2002, see Annual Report 2002, p. 214 (access to
Council documents).
207. Supra note 83.
208. CONV 505/03 CONTRIB 206 (by Söderman, “The functioning of the institutions”, 23
Jan. 2003).
209. Art. I-50(3) and Art. II-102 CT.
Ombudsman 735
tional Treaty the principle that decisions are taken as openly as possible.210
This would have given the principle of transparency a prominent place as a
fundamental value of the Union. This idea was downgraded in the Constitu-
tional Treaty somewhat. Nevertheless, the principle of transparency appears
as a core constitutional principle of the Union. Transparency is mentioned in
the non-operative preamble211 and as an element of the principle of represen-
tative democracy in Title VI on the democratic life of the Union (Art. I-46(3)
CT).212 The central provision is Article I-50 CT “Transparency of the pro-
ceedings of the Union Institutions”.213 Additionally, the institutional part
contains common provisions on transparency and openness (Arts II-398 and
399 CT).214 Finally, the Constitutional Treaty enshrines a right of access to
Union documents on individual request. This right is a fundamental (“Char-
ter”) right, and relates not only to one’s own files but to all documents.215
Access to one’s own file is also part of the fundamental right to good admin-
istration (Art. II-101(2) lit. (b) CT). The purpose of these rights is to enable
citizens to scrutinize the activities of those exercising public authority and to
assess them. In this perspective, the right of access to documents is not only
210. CONV 505/03 CONTRIB 206, supra note 208; see also Amendment Form: Sugges-
tion for amendment of Art. 1(1) by Söderman.
211. The preamble (para 2) of the Constitutional Treaty proclaims that Europe “wishes to
deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life”.
212. According to Art. I-46(3) CT, “[d]ecisions shall be taken as openly and as closely to
the citizens as possible”.
213. Art. I-50 CT: “(1) In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of
civil society the Union institutions, bodies and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as
possible. (2) The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when consider-
ing and voting on a draft legislative act. (3) Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State shall have, under the condi-
tions laid down in Part III, a right of access to all documents of Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies, whatever their medium. European laws shall lay down the general prin-
ciples and limits which, on grounds of public or private interest, govern the right of access to
such documents.”
214. Art. III-398(1) CT: “In carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European
administration.” Art. III-399 CT: “(1) The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the
Union shall ensure transparency in their work and shall, pursuant to Article I-50, lay down in
their rules of procedure the specific provisions for public access to documents. … (2) The
European Parliament and the Council shall ensure publication of the documents relating to the
legislative procedures under the terms laid down by the European law referred to in Article I-
50(4).”
215. Art. II-102 CT “Right of access to documents”: “Any citizen of the Union, and any
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has the right
of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, whatever
their medium.”
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a fundamental right to be exercised according to one’s personal needs but
also an element of citizenship which may be exercised in the public inter-
est.216
A different aspect of transparency is probably even more closely related to
the democratic principle. It concerns the law-making procedures in which
the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission participate. The pertinent
sessions, debates and documents must be public. Public law-making means
that every interested person can look into the process in its entirety, without
having to request for a specific piece of information. It has been a long way
towards complete transparency of the European legislative process, which is
now laid down in Article I-50(2)CT: “The European Parliament shall meet in
public, as shall the Council when considering and voting on a draft legisla-
tive act.”
Recently, the European Ombudsman issued a decision on access to the
Constitutional Convention’s Praesidium documents. In the course of the
Convention, summary notes of Praesidium’s discussions and all documents
resulting from them were published on the website. Agendas and minutes of
the Praesidium’s discussions, however, remained secret. The Praesidium’s
justification for this observance of secrecy was that otherwise the
Praesidium’s discussions could no longer fulfil their function as a stimulus to
the constitutional debate. Instead, they would themselves become the object
of controversy. Thereby the activity of the Convention’s decision-making
process would be undermined. This argument was accepted by the Ombuds-
man in a decision following a complaint of an NGO concerning the refusal
of access to the agendas and minutes of the Praesidium.217 The Ombudsman
stated that the Transparency Regulation218 does not as such apply to the
documents held by the Convention. Nevertheless, he recommended that the
Regulation’s provisions on exceptions should be referred to by analogy.219
Consequently, access to a document drawn up by the Praesidium for internal
use can be refused only if disclosure of the document would seriously under-
mine the institution’s decision-making process and if an overriding public in-
terest in disclosure is lacking.220 This condition is no longer present after
216. Harden, op. cit. supra note 10, at 232.
217. Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1795/2002/IJH of 12 June 2003,
opinion of the president of the European Convention and decision para 2.7. (www.euro-
ombudmsan.eu.int/decision/en/021795convention.htm, visited on 18 Aug. 2004).
218. Supra note 201.
219. Decision of 12 June 2003, supra note 217, paras 2.4. and 2.6.
220. Transparency Regulation 1049/2001, supra note 201, Art. 4(3)(1).
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closure of the Convention. Consequently, the previously secret Presidium’s
documents must now be published.221 The Ombudsman’s decision may well
have an impact on future procedures of constitution-making or amendment.
Overall, the Ombudsman’s “crusade for transparency”222 has been an impor-
tant factor of progress in this field.
5.5. The Ombudsman and good administration
As it is the Ombudsman’s task to discover and criticize maladministration in
the European Union, he is of course strongly interested in the other side of
the coin that is good administration. In the course of European integration, a
full-fledged set of European principles of good administrative behaviour has
emerged.223 This legal evolution could build on Member States’ traditions.
The idea of good administration has Scandinavian origins – in that tradition,
the concept as such seems to enjoy a legal status.224 In contrast, both in the
Roman law tradition and in English law, good administrative behaviour is
outside the realm of the law. Due to these diverging traditions, the legal qual-
ity of the notion of good administrative behaviour in EC law has been doubt-
ful for some time.225 Meanwhile, good administration is not only widely
recognized as a legal concept, but even as a general principle of Community
law.226 However, not all the specific obligations of European officials flow-
ing from this general principle are legal obligations, so legal rules and good
221. Decision of 12 June 2003, supra note 217, para 2.8.
222. Magnette, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 945. See generally on transparency and the role of
the Ombudsman in this context Söderman, “Transparency as a fundamental principle of the
European Union”, in Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Ed.), Die
Konsolidierung der europäischen Verfassung von Nizza bis 2004 (Baden-Baden, 2002), 53–
70; Harden, “Citizenship and information”, 7 EPL (2001), 165–193; Harden, “The European
Ombudsman and the right of public access to documents”, in Institut Suisse de droit comparé
(Ed.), L’integration européenne: historique et perspectives (Zürich, 2002), pp. 129–138;
Harden, “The European Ombudsman’s effort to increase openness in the Union”, in Deckmyn
(Ed.), Increasing Transparency in the European Union? (Maastricht, 2002), pp. 123–145.
223. See Usher, supra note 27, at pp. 100–120; Bauer, Das Recht auf eine gute Verwaltung
im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Frankfurt a. M., 2002); Lais, op. cit. supra note 178,
447–483.
224. See Martínez Soria, “Die Kodizes für gute Verwaltungspraxis: Ein Beitrag zur
Kodifikation des Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts der EG”, 37 EuR (2001), 682, at 684–688.
225. In the 1980s, it was still argued that good administration was not a general principle of
Community law and not judicially enforceable. Case 64/82, Tradax v. Commission, [1984]
ECR 1359, Opinion A.G. Slynn, 1381 at 1386.
226. Case T-54/99, max.mobil v. Commission, [2002] ECR II-313, para 48.
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administration overlap.227 Consequently, the Ombudsman’s review is two-
fold, examining legality and extra-legal factors.228
5.5.1. The codification of European administrative law
Good administration requires clear legal standards. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that the European Ombudsman has been a partisan of the idea of a codi-
fication of European administrative law. He adopted the “European Code of
Good Administrative Behaviour” of 28 July 1999,229 which became his
“principal battle horse”.230 It contains legal or even constitutional principles
such as lawfulness, proportionality, absence of abuse of power, or the duty to
state reasons, which are in part also codified in the Treaties. Furthermore,
the model code embodies (traditional and new) fundamental rights of citi-
zens, such as absence of discrimination, the right to be heard, or access to
documents. Finally, the model code endorses extra-legal standards, such as
courtesy, acknowledgment of receipt and the like. The Ombudsman urged
the European institutions to adopt codes on the basis of this model.231 But
this plan did not fully work out. True, a number of Community institutions,
bodies and agencies, notably the European Parliament, adopted the Ombuds-
man’s model code. Most importantly, the Commission adopted a “Code of
good administrative behaviour for staff of the European Commission in their
relations with the public”232 which includes most of the Ombudsman’s pro-
posals. However, that code forms part of the Commission’s rules of proce-
dure and thus does not confer any actionable rights on citizens. Nevertheless,
complaints alleging disregard of the Commission code may be lodged with
the European Ombudsman.233 Other bodies, notably the Council, have so far
227. Usher, supra note 27, at p. 100.
228. Bonnor, supra note 88, at p. 43.
229. Supra note 83. See for a good analysis Martínez Soria, supra note 224, 682–705; over-
view in Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1, 107–113. See also Söderman, “What is good ad-
ministration? The European Ombudsman’s Code of Good Administrative Behaviour”, speech
given at the international seminar “The Ombudsmen and European Union Law”, Bucharest 21–
24 April 2001.
230. Magnette, supra note 4, at p. 942.
231. Identical Draft recommendations of the European Ombudsman (in the own initiative
inquiry OI/1/98/OV) of 28 July 1999 and 13 Sept. 1999 (addressed to the Commission). The
same draft recommendation was also addressed to the Parliament and the Council on 29 July
1999, www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/oi980001.htm, visited on 28 Oct. 2004.
232. Commission decision of 17 Oct. 2000 amending it Rules of Procedure, Annex (2000/
633/EC, ECS, Euratom), O.J. 2000, L 267/63.
233. Commission Code, supra note 232, para 6 (at p. 66).
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not adopted any code, and other institutions have codes which do not con-
form to the Ombudsman’s model.234
Therefore, the Ombudsman began to consider a different strategy. He rec-
ommended the adoption of a European administrative law, applicable to all
the Union institutions. Its legal basis would be – under the current Treaty law
– the general clause of Article 308 EC.235 In the Constitutional Convention,
the Ombudsman proposed to create a clear constitutional basis for the adop-
tion of an administrative law.236 This proposal was not realized. Neverthe-
less, the Commission is currently considering submitting a draft proposal for
an administrative law in the course of 2006.237 Its legal foundation would be,
after the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, the “flexibility” clause
of Article I-18 CT.
5.5.2. The fundamental right to good administration
The Ombudsman has consistently argued that good administration (as such)
is not only a legal principle, but that there is even a fundamental right to
good administration. It was the Ombudsman who first formally suggested
that a right to good administration be included in the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights.238 However, it is not quite clear whether his interven-
tion was decisive, or whether such a right would have been created any-
way.239 Be it as it may, the Charter is the first international human rights
234. Detailed references in Martínez Soria, supra note 224, at p. 681.
235. Recommendation in two Special Reports of April 2000: Special Report following the
draft recommendation to the European Commission in complaint 713/98/IHJ, at p. 12 et seq.
and Special Report following the own-initiative inquiry into the existence and the public acces-
sibility, in the different Community institutions and bodies, of a Code of Good Administrative
Behaviour (OI/98/OV), at p. 12 et seq. All Special Reports can be found on the Ombudsman’s
website. www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/special/en/default.htm, visited on 2 Sept. 2004.
236. CONV 221/02 CONTRIB 76, supra note 66. The proposed text was: “The Community
institutions and bodies shall carry out their activities in accordance with the right to good ad-
ministration. Principles of good administrative behaviour are to be observed by the Community
institutions and bodies and their staff shall be laid down by the Council, acting in accordance
with the procedure referred to in Article 251 within one year of the entry into force of the
Treaty …”
237. Statement of the Secretary General of the European Commission, mentioned in
Diamandouros, supra note 5.
238. The right to good administration was not included in the list drawn up by the
Praesidium of the Charter Convention as a basis for discussion (CHARTE 4112/00 of 27 Jan.
2000). See the proposal in the speech by the European Ombudsman in the Charter Convention
on 2 Feb. 2000: Public Hearing on the draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, Sec. 3 (CHARTE 4131/00 of 17 Feb. 2000), www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/
en/Charter1.htm, visited on 1 Sept. 2004.
239. According to a commentary on the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the right
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instrument which explicitly enshrines the right to good administration.240 Ar-
ticle 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is now reproduced without any
changes to Article II-101 CT.241 It comprises, inter alia, a right to impartial,
fair and timely handling of administrative affairs, the right to be heard, and
the right to have access to one’s file. Moreover, the administration’s duty to
give reasons for its decisions is made part of the new fundamental right. This
well-known obligation is currently enshrined in Article 253 EC and in Ar-
ticle 18 of the above-mentioned Code of Good Administrative Behaviour.242
It has been qualified by the Court as an “essential procedural requirement”
in terms of the review of legality under Article 230 EC (Art. II-365 CT) and
constitutes an actionable ground of illegality. In the Constitutional Treaty, the
duty to give reasons figures as a principle common to the Union’s legal acts
(Art. I-38 CT). The fundamental right to good administration furthermore
comprises the right to damages for institutional wrongs committed towards
individuals. This provision relates to the Union’s non-contractual liability un-
der Article 288 EC (Art. III-431 CT). Finally, the right to good administra-
tion encompasses the right to communicate with the institutions in any
official language.
Good administration is a fundamental part of citizenship. Therefore, the
Ombudsman had in the Convention suggested including the citizens’ right to
good administration in the article outlining citizens’ rights.243 This proposal
to good administration was incited by the Ombudsman (Magiera in Meyer (Ed.), supra note
185, Art. 41 para 2. In contrast, Magnette, supra note 4, at p. 942 fn. 3 opines that the
Ombudsman’s influence in that regard was minor, because Charter Convention members had
thought of including the new right even before the interventions of Söderman.
240. In the view of the Commission, the right to good administration is a “new” right which
had been, until the adoption of the Charter, not explicitly acknowledged as a fundamental right
(Commission Communication on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
COM(2000)559 final, para 9).
241. Art. II-101 CT: “(1) Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
of the Union. (2) This right includes: (a) the right of every person to be heard, before any
individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken; (b) the right of every
person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidential-
ity and of professional and business secrecy; (c) the obligation of the administration to give
reasons for its decisions. (3) Every person has the right to have the Union make good any
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in accor-
dance with the general principles common to the law of the Member States. (4) Every person
may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the Constitution and must
have an answer in the same language.”
242. Supra note 83.
243. Ombudsman speech of 27/28 Feb. 2003 in the Convention’s plenary meeting, pursu-
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was realized only in part: the article on citizenship mentions only one par-
ticular aspect of good administration, namely the language right (Art. I-
10(2)(d) CT).
Given its legal status as a fundamental right, the right to good administra-
tion could theoretically be enforced just as any other European fundamental
right by judicial and non-judicial means. However, in practice the Ombuds-
man does have a greater role to play here than with other fundamental rights.
6. Conclusions
This study sought to assess the merits of the European Ombudsman within a
highly dynamic constitutional system. The Ombudsman was established in
order to improve the legitimacy of European governance. While the new in-
stitution was initially criticized as window-dressing by some observers,244
this study has revealed that the European Ombudsman institution now forms
one of the building blocks of good European governance, and strengthens
both European rule of law and European democracy. Although these consti-
tutional principles are to some extent intertwined and interdependent, I con-
sider the Ombudsman’s merits to lie primarily in the former field. However,
the legitimacy problems of European governance relate predominantly to the
functioning of democracy. Here the contributions of the European Ombuds-
man are more indirect, namely by strengthening the procedural side of citi-
zenship, by realigning European identity,245 and by improving transparency.
The Ombudsman’s activities overlap with the functions of other European
institutions: individual redress is offered not only by the Ombudsman, but
also by the courts and the parliamentary petitions committee. Administrative
and legal reforms are effected primarily by the Council, the Parliament, and
the Commission, which the Ombudsman can approach in order to incite re-
form. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman institution does not needlessly dupli-
cate the activities of existing grievance mechanisms. It occupies a “unique
space”246 between the other institutions.
Virtually all Member States of the Union have national ombuds-institu-
tions or similar bodies. In comparison with some of them, the European
ant to the proposal of a Convention member. www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/2003-
02-28.htm, visited on 5 Jan. 2005.
244. See e.g. Magliveras, “Best intentions but empty words: The European Ombudsman”,
20 EL Rev. (1995), 401–408.
245. Tierney, op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 529.
246. Heede, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 604.
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Ombudsman’s teeth are not very sharp.247 He notably lacks two important
powers: the power to formally trigger law reforms, and the power to refer
suspected illegalities to Community courts.248 Moreover, the European Om-
budsman operates in a distinct, transnational context and therefore faces spe-
cific problems. The European Ombudsman must cope with a European
administration which is influenced by different, in part hardly reconcilable
national administrative traditions. Most importantly, the national ombuds-
men can in many Member States operate forcefully because ultimately their
actions are backed by a strong national parliament.249 In contrast, the Euro-
pean Parliament is not strong. Consequently, the European Ombudsman
must even more than his national counterparts rely on a cooperative style of
control and of administrative reform.250
Since the European Ombudsman’s inception, important elements of his
working environment have changed. In order to operate successfully, the Eu-
ropean Ombudsman must adapt to the changing context, and it currently
looks as if the institution is capable of doing so. In all Member States, the
administration is evolving towards lean administration and New Public Man-
agement (NPM), and this change of paradigm is not without effect on the
European administration. Somewhat antagonistic to the NPM-euphoria, de-
mocracy and human rights protection are gaining importance. The new
Member States of the Union, which have only recently created national
ombuds-institutions for themselves, may be – due to their national history –
even more sensitive in this regard than the old Member States. Last but not
least, a written European Constitution has been adopted, which codifies vari-
ous relevant constitutional principles and which slightly strengthens the Eu-
ropean Ombudsman’s institutional position, although the opportunity to
codify systematically judicial and non-judicial remedies was missed. Not
only on this point, but as a general matter, the Ombudsman’s participation in
the Constitutional Convention was a modest success. His substantial propos-
als only in part found their way into the Draft Constitution and later into the
Constitutional Treaty.
Although the European Ombudsman can be characterized as “occupying
the administrative hinterland of the formal law”,251 his direct and more often
247. Hertogh, “The European Ombudsman: Different roles in a demanding context”, 3 The
European Yearbook of Comparative Government and Public Administration (1996), 337–349,
at 346.
248. Tierney, op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 528.
249. Hertogh, op. cit. supra note 247, at p. 346.
250. Cf. id.
251. Rawlings, op. cit. supra note 113, at p. 17.
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indirect contributions to hard legal reform should not be underestimated.
Rules on access to documents, procedural safeguards in the Commission’s
infringement proceedings, and the not yet completed codification of prin-
ciples of good administrative behaviour are for the most part due to his per-
sistent efforts.252
The average Ombudsman-institution lacks “hard powers”, and so, gener-
ally speaking, is an institution which can only really be effective where hab-
its of constitutionalism are well established and believed in. Its success “is
likely to be the greatest in the sort of political and constitutional community
which needs him least. ... It is more likely to make good government better
than bad government good.”253 With this caveat, and far from falling prey to
an irrational “Ombudsmania”,254 we can safely conclude that the European
Ombudsman has matured to an indispensable factor of European constitu-
tionalism, and that the network of ombudsmen in Europe may contribute to
European constitutional convergence.
252. Guckelberger, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 157.
253. Wheare, Maladministration and its Remedies (London, 1973) at pp. 165–166.
254. Caiden, op. cit. supra note 60, at p. 5
